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In Prometheus Radio Project v. F.C.C., 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2004) (―Prometheus 
I‖), we considered revisions by the Federal Communications Commission (the ―Commission‖ 
or ―FCC‖) to its regulations governing broadcast media ownership promulgated following its 
2002 Biennial Regulatory Review.  See 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the 
Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,620, 2003 WL 21511828 (July 2, 2003) (the ―2003 Order‖).  We 
affirmed the Commission‘s authority to regulate media ownership but remanded aspects of 
the Commission‘s 2003 Order that were not adequately supported by the record, including its 
numerical limits for local television ownership, local radio ownership rule, rule on cross-
ownership of media within local markets, and repeal of the failed station solicitation rule.  
Prometheus I, 373 F.3d at 382, 421.   
 In these consolidated appeals, we consider the Commission‘s most recent revisions to 
its media ownership rules.  In December 2007, following its 2006 Quadrennial Regulatory 
Review, the Commission announced an overhaul of its newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership 
rule and granted permanent waivers of the rule to five specific newspaper/broadcast 
combinations.  2006 Quadrennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Commission’s 
Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Report and Order and Order on Reconsideration, 23 
F.C.C.R. 2010, 2055-56, 2008 WL 294635 (Dec. 18, 2007) (the ―2008 Order‖).  It chose to 
retain its radio/television cross-ownership rule and local television and radio ownership rules 
in existence prior to the 2003 Order.
1
  It also retained its failed station solicitation rule, and 
set out a series of other measures to address broadcast ownership diversity, in a separate 
order.  See Promoting Diversification of Ownership in the Broadcasting Services, 2006 
Quadrennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules 
                                              
1
 The versions of these rules in the 2003 Order never went into effect because we stayed that 
order pending our review and continued the stay in Prometheus I.   
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and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
Report and Order and Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 23 F.C.C.R. 5922, 
2008 WL 612180 (Dec. 18, 2007) (the ―Diversity Order‖). 
The 2008 Order was challenged by multiple parties.  In 2009, the FCC moved for 
voluntary remand of the 2008 Order.  We denied that opposed motion. 
Today we affirm the 2008 Order with the exception of the newspaper/broadcast cross-
ownership rule, for which the Commission failed to meet the notice and comment 
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (the ―APA‖), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq.  We 
also remand those provisions of the Diversity Order that rely on the revenue-based ―eligible 
entity‖ definition, and the FCC‘s decision to defer consideration of other proposed 
definitions (such as for a socially and economically disadvantaged business (―SDB‖)), so that 
it may adequately justify or modify its approach to advancing broadcast ownership by 
minorities and women. 
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
We need not reiterate our lengthy discussion of the history and parameters of the 
Commission‘s regulatory authority contained in Prometheus I.  See 373 F.3d at 382-86.   
However, to place our decision in context, we briefly recount the Commission‘s 2003 
modifications to its ownership rules, the resulting objections, and our decisions with respect 
to each rule.  We also summarize the Commission‘s most recent modifications to its rules 
arising out of its 2006 Quadrennial Regulatory Review process.   
A.  Our Review of the Commission’s 2003 Report and Order  
In September 2002, the Commission issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 
announcing that it would review six of its broadcast ownership rules in its 2002 Biennial 
Regulatory Review.  Id. at 386 (citing 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the 
Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 18,503, 
¶ 6, 2002 WL 31108252 (2002) (the ―2002 Notice‖)).  In 2003, it issued an Order modifying 
the rules.  See 2003 Order.  We provide below a brief description of the rules, and the actions 
we took with respect to each.  
1. Newspaper/Broadcast and Radio/Broadcast Cross-Ownership 
Rules  
Starting in 1975, the Commission banned common ownership of a full-service 
broadcast television station and a daily public newspaper.  Prometheus I, 373 F.3d at 387 
(citing Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636 of the Commission’s Rules Relating 
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to Multiple Ownerships of Standard, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, 50 F.C.C.2d 
1046, 1975 WL 30457 (1975)).  Prior to 2003, it also regulated common ownership of 
television and radio stations.  Id.  In its 2003 Order, the Commission determined that the 
existing rules were no longer in the public interest, repealed them, and replaced them with a 
single set of Cross-Media Limits using a methodological tool called the ―Diversity Index.‖2  
Id. at 387-88.   In Prometheus I, we upheld the Commission‘s decision that a complete ban 
on newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership was no longer necessary to protect diversity, but 
that continuing to regulate cross-ownership was in the public interest.  Id. at 399-400.  
However, we did not uphold the Cross-Media Limits themselves because the Commission 
had failed to provide reasoned analysis to support them.  Id. at 402-12.  Specifically, we 
concluded that it ―did not justify its choice and weight of specific media outlets . . . [selected] 
for inclusion in the Diversity Index,‖ ―did not justify its assumption of equal market shares . . 
. [for] all outlets within the same media type (that is, television stations, daily papers, or radio 
stations),‖ and ―did not rationally derive its Cross-Media Limits from the Diversity Index 
results.‖  Id. at 404, 408, 409.   
2. Local Television Ownership Rule 
The local television ownership rule allowed one entity to own two television stations 
in a market (a television duopoly) as long as at least one of the stations was not ranked 
among the market‘s four largest stations and at least eight independently owned and operated 
stations (called ―eight voices‖) would remain post-merger.  Id. at 386.  In 2003, the 
Commission amended this rule to permit triopolies in markets with 18 or more stations and 
duopolies in markets with 17 or fewer.  Id. at 386-87.  The Commission also repealed its 
failed station solicitation rule, which required applicants seeking waivers of the local 
television rule to provide notice of the sale to potential out-of-market buyers before it could 
sell a failed, failing, or unbuilt station to an in-market buyer.  Id. at 420.  The failed station 
solicitation rule was adopted in 1999 to alleviate concerns that the FCC‘s decision to allow 
local television duopolies—hence more concentration of ownership—would undermine 
station ownership by minorities.  Id.  We upheld the retention of the ban on cross-ownership 
of the top four stations in a market (known as the ―top four‖ restriction), and the relaxation of 
the eight voices rule, but remanded the specific numerical limits for the Commission to 
―support and harmonize its rationale.‖  Id. at 415-16, 420.  We also remanded its repeal of the 
                                              
2
 As we explained in Prometheus I, the Diversity Index was a ―developed [by the 
Commission] as a measure of viewpoint diversity in local markets to identify those ‗at risk‘ 
markets where consolidation would have a deleterious effect. . . . [It] is a highly modified 
version of the formula for measuring market concentration—the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index—applied by the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission to analyze 
mergers.‖  373 F.3d at 388 (internal citation omitted). 
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failed station solicitation rule, as the Commission had failed to consider the effect on 
minority ownership of the repeal despite the rule being the only existing regulation intended 
to promote minority television ownership.  Id. at 421.   
3. Local Radio Ownership Rule 
Congress established specific numerical limits on radio ownership in the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 110 (1996) (codified as 
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 202(b)(1)) (the ―1996 Telecommunications Act‖).  The 2003 Order 
retained these limits, but replaced the ―contour-overlap‖ method3 for determining radio 
markets with a geographic method and announced that the Commission would include 
noncommercial stations in the station count for each market.  Prometheus I, 373 F.3d at 387. 
We upheld the new market definition and the inclusion of noncommercial stations but 
remanded the numerical limits for further consideration, including the AM ―subcaps.‖4  Id. at 
423-426, 431-35.  Specifically, we held that the Commission had failed to support its 
proposition that the existence of five equal-sized competitors shows that local markets are 
sufficiently competitive (or that the Commission‘s limits would actually ensure five 
competitors) and to explain why it was necessary to impose an AM subcap at all.  Id. at 432-
35.   
                                              
3 
As we explained in Prometheus I,  
to determine whether an entity may acquire a radio station under the 
local radio rule, the Commission first must know how many radio 
stations are in that station‘s local market (called the ‗denominator‘ 
figure).  The size of the market determines which numerical limit 
applies.  Second, the Commission must determine how many radio 
stations in that market would be owned by the same entity if the entity 
acquired the station it proposes (called the ‗numerator‘ figure).  If this 
figure is within the numerical limit, the transaction may proceed.  
Under the contour-overlap methodology, the Commission calculates the 
numerator by counting the acquiring entity‘s radio stations that all have 
overlapping signal contours. . . . The Commission calculates the 
denominator by counting all of the stations whose contours intersect 
with at least one (not all) of the contours of another station in the 
numerator.   
373 F.3d at 423 (emphasis in original). 
4
 ―Subcaps‖ are ownership limits on stations within the same service—AM or FM.  See 2003 
Order ¶ 235.   
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4. Dual Network Rule 
Under the dual network rule, a television station is prohibited from affiliating with 
more than one of the four largest networks.  The top four restriction prohibits common 
ownership by ABC, CBS, Fox, and NBC.  Id. at 388.  We upheld the Commission‘s decision 
to retain this rule in 2003, as it was supported by ample record evidence.  Id. at 417-18.   
5. Promoting Minority Ownership: Definition  of Eligible Entities in 
Transfer Rule and MMTC Proposals 
In Prometheus I we concluded that the FCC had failed to consider proposals to 
promote minority broadcast ownership that the Minority Media and Telecommunications 
Council (the ―MMTC‖) had submitted during the Commission‘s 2002 biennial review 
proceeding.  The 2003 Order proposed a separate proceeding to address proposals for 
advancing minority and female ownership in broadcasting.  See 2003 Order ¶¶ 49-50 
(promising to issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to address the MMTC's 13 specific 
proposals).  We remanded this decision (in effect, to defer consideration of these proposals) 
and ordered the Commission to address them at the same time that it addressed the other 
remanded issues from the 2003 Order.  Prometheus I, 373 F.3d at 421 n.59.   
We also rejected concerns regarding the FCC‘s new transfer rule that prohibits ―the 
transfer or sale of grandfathered [radio/television] combinations that violate its local 
ownership limits except to certain ‗eligible entities‘ that qualify as small businesses.‖  Id. at 
426-427 (internal citation omitted).  In upholding the transfer rule, however, we 
―anticipate[d] . . . that by the next quadrennial review the Commission will have the benefit 
of a stable definition of SDBs, as well as several years of implementation experience, to help 
it reevaluate whether an SDB-based waiver will better promote the Commission's diversity 
objectives‖ than the small business definition it used in the rule.  Id. at 427-28 n.70. 
B.  The Commission’s 2006 Quadrennial Review, 2008 Order, and Diversity 
Order 
In July 2006, the FCC began another quadrennial review.  Marking the culmination of 
the review process in December 2008, the FCC issued its 2008 Order containing changes to 
its ownership rules made in response to our remand, and deemed necessary to the public 
interest in the course of its own review, offering justifications for those changes, and issuing 
five permanent waivers of its newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rule.  Simultaneously, 
the FCC issued the Diversity Order in response to our remand and to carry out its statutory 
duty to enhance opportunities for minorities and women in broadcast ownership.   
We consider the proposed rule changes, the waivers, and the Diversity Order below.  
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The following is a brief description of the rule changes made by the Commission following 
its 2006 Quadrennial Review that are challenged by one or more of the parties.   
1.  Newspaper/Broadcast Cross-Ownership (“NBCO”) Rule  
In its 2008 Order, the Commission abandoned the cross-media limits announced in the 
2003 Order, declined to retain the ban abandoned in the 2003 Order (but still in existence due 
to our stay), and adopted an entirely new rule.  Under the new rule, the Commission will 
consider newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership proposals on a case-by-case basis using a 
four-factor test, set forth below, guided by reversible presumptions.   
In the top 20 Designated Market Areas (―DMAs‖), the Commission will presume ―that 
it is not inconsistent with the public interest for an entity to own . . . either (a) a newspaper 
and a television station if (1) the television station is not ranked among the top four stations 
in the DMA, and (2) at least eight independent ‗major media voices‘ remain in the DMA;5 or 
(b) a newspaper and a radio station.‖  2008 Order ¶ 53.  In all other markets, the Commission 
will presume ―that it is inconsistent with the public interest for an entity to own newspaper 
and broadcast combinations.‖  Id. at ¶ 63.  However, the Commission will reverse that 
negative presumption if either (1) the proposed combination initiates at least seven hours a 
week of additional local news programming, or (2) the newspaper or broadcast outlet 
qualifies as failed or failing.  Id. at ¶¶ 65-67.  
 Guided by these reversible presumptions, the Commission will consider the following 
four factors in determining whether to approve a proposed combination:   
 (1) the extent to which cross-ownership will serve to increase 
the amount of local news
6
 disseminated through the affected 
media outlets in the combination; (2) whether each affected 
media outlet will exercise its own independent news judgment; 
(3) the level of concentration in the Nielsen DMA,
7
 and (4) the 
                                              
5
 ―Major media voices‖ are defined in the 2008 Order ―as full-power commercial and 
noncommercial television stations and major newspapers.‖  2008 Order ¶ 57.  Major 
newspapers ―are newspapers that are published at least four days a week within the DMA and 
have a circulation exceeding 5 percent of the households in the DMA.‖  Id. at n.183. 
6
 In the 2008 Order, ―[t]he term ‗local news‘ includes traditional newscasts as well as 
programming that addresses issues of local political interest or issues of public importance in 
the market.‖  Id. at ¶ 70. 
7
 A Nielsen DMA is a region in which residents receive the same or similar television 
offerings.  Market concentration is not further defined in the 2008 Order, and the FCC 
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financial condition of the newspaper or broadcast station, and if 
the newspaper or broadcast station is in financial distress, the 
owner‘s commitment to invest significantly in newsroom 
operations.   
Id. at ¶ 68.  However, the presumptions—negative and positive—present a ―high 
hurdle‖ for opposing parties to overcome.  Id.  
2.  Radio/Broadcast Cross-Ownership Rule 
The Commission also abandoned the cross-media limits proposed in 2003 with respect 
to radio/broadcast cross-ownership.  Instead, it announced that it would retain its pre-2003 
rule (still in effect at that time due to our stay of the 2003 rule), which ―limits the number of 
commercial radio and television stations an entity may own in the same market, with the 
degree of common ownership permitted varying depending on the size of the relevant 
market.‖  Id. at ¶ 80.  More specifically, an entity may own up to two television stations and 
up to six radio stations (or one and seven) in a market where 20 independently owned media 
―voices‖ would remain post-merger, and up to two television stations and four radio stations 
where 10 voices would remain.  Id. at ¶ 80 n.259.  An entity may own two television stations 
and one radio station regardless of the number of voices remaining in the market.  Id.
8
   
3. Local Television Ownership Rule 
The Commission also chose to retain the pre-2003 local television ownership rule, 
under which an entity may own two television stations in the same DMA if (1) the station 
contours do not overlap; or (2) at least one of the stations in the combination is not ranked 
among the top four in terms of audience share and at least eight independently owned 
broadcast television stations would remain in the DMA after the combination.  Id. at ¶¶ 87, 
96.  It abandoned completely the relaxed numerical limits in the 2003 Order.  Additionally, 
the Commission reinstated the failed station solicitation rule. 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
announced that it ―will not employ any single metric‖ in measuring concentration.  Id. at ¶ 
73.  Instead, the 2008 Order ―stress[es] . . . that in future adjudicative proceedings addressing 
proposed combinations parties are free to point to any metric of their choosing in arguing that 
a proposed combination either should or should not be approved.‖  Id.  
8 
Note that all of these combinations must also comply with the local television and radio 
ownership rules.  Id. at ¶ 80 n.259.   
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4. Local Radio Ownership Rule 
As it did in the 2003 Order, the Commission retained the numerical limits prescribed 
by Congress in the 1996 Telecommunications Act (and the revised market definition we 
upheld in Prometheus I).  See 2008 Order ¶¶ 110-11.  However, it offered a new justification 
for those limits and for the AM/FM subcaps, as we had rejected as unreasonable the 
rationales given in its 2003 Order.  Id. at ¶¶ 130-34; Prometheus I, 373 F.3d at 430-35.   
The rule provides that  
an entity may own, operate, or control (1) up to eight 
commercial radio stations, not more than five of which are in the 
same service (i.e., AM or FM), in a radio market with 45 or 
more full-power, commercial and non-commercial radio 
stations; (2) up to seven commercial stations, not more than four 
of which are in the same service, in a radio market with between 
30 and 44 (inclusive) full-power, commercial and non-
commercial radio stations;  (3) up to six commercial radio 
stations, not more than four of which are in the same service, in 
a radio market with between 15 and 29 (inclusive) full-power, 
commercial and non-commercial radio stations; and (4) up to 
five commercial radio stations, not more than three of which are 
in the same service, in a radio market with 14 or fewer full-
power, commercial and noncommercial radio stations, except 
that an entity may not own, operate, or control more than 50 
percent of the stations in such a market.   
2008 Order ¶ 110.   
5. Diversity Order  
In its separate Diversity Order, the FCC adopted, with modifications, 13 proposals 
submitted during the rulemaking proceeding and rejected 10 other proposals intended to 
increase broadcast ownership by minorities and women.  It also sought comment on nine 
separate proposals in the accompanying Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (the 
―Third FNPR‖).  Diversity Order ¶¶ 80-101.  It did not consider proposed SDB definitions.  
The Diversity Order adopts a number of measures to increase ownership opportunities 
for ―eligible entities,‖9 which are defined to include all entities that qualify as small 
                                              
9
 The Diversity Order:  
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businesses under the standards of the Small Business Administration (the ―SBA‖) for 
industry groupings based on revenue.  Among other provisions, the Diversity Order also 
establishes several measures intended to eliminate fraud and discrimination in broadcast 
ownership.  
6. Subsequent Procedural History 
In March 2008, Common Cause and several other groups
10
 filed a Petition for 
Reconsideration of the Commission‘s 2008 Order.  See Common Cause et al., Petition for 
Reconsideration, MB Docket 60-121 (Mar. 24, 2008) (―Petition for Reconsideration‖).  In 
                                                                                                                                                  
[c]hanges [the Commission‘s] construction permit deadlines to 
allow ―eligible entities‖ that acquire expiring construction 
permits additional time to build out the facility; [r]evises the 
Commission‘s equity/debt plus . . . attribution standard; 
[m]odifies the Commission‘s distress sale policy . . . ; [a]dopts 
an Equal Transactional Opportunity Rule that bars race or 
gender in broadcast transactions; [a]dopts a ―zero-tolerance‖ 
policy for ownership fraud and ―fast-track‖ ownership-fraud 
claims and seeks to resolve them within 90 days; [r]equires 
broadcasters renewing their licenses to certify that their 
advertising sales contracts do not discriminate on the basis of 
race or gender; [e]ncourages local and regional banks to 
participate in SBA-guaranteed loan programs . . . ; [g]ives 
priority to any entity financing or incubating an eligible entity in 
certain duopoly situations; [c]onsiders requests to extend 
divestiture deadlines in mergers in which applicants have 
actively solicited bids for divested properties from eligible 
entities; [c]onvenes an ―Access-to-Capital‖ conference that will 
focus on the investment banking and private equity communities 
and opportunities to acquire financing; [a]nnounces the creation 
of a guidebook on diversity . . . ; and [r]evises the exception to 
the prohibition on the assignment or transfer of grandfathered 
radio station combinations. 
News Release, FCC, FCC Adopts Rules to Promote Diversification of Broadcast Ownership 
(Dec. 18, 2007).  
10
 Those groups included the Benton Foundation, Consumers Action, the Massachusetts 
Consumers‘ Coalition, NYC Wireless, James J. Elekes, and the National Hispanic Media 
Coalition.    
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July 2008, Citizen Petitioners
11
 filed for review of that Order in our Court.  Subsequently, 
several other petitions for review were filed before us, all of which were consolidated with 
that of Citizen Petitioners.  In December 2008, Citizen Petitioners filed a motion to hold 
these cases in abeyance pending the FCC‘s action on the Petition for Reconsideration.  We 
granted that motion and ordered the parties to show cause why the stay entered in 2003, and 
continued in Prometheus I, should not be lifted.  On consideration of their responses, we 
requested that the parties file status reports regarding the pending Petition for 
Reconsideration and our stay.  Order Requesting Status Reports, June 12, 2009.  After 
reviewing the status reports, we requested that the Commission advise us ―when it expect[ed] 
to issue its decision on reconsideration of the 2006 Quadrennial Regulatory Review.‖  Order 
Requesting Further Information, Nov. 4, 2009 (emphasis in original).   
In response, the Commission made clear that it was ―already working hard to 
reexamine‖ the issues raised in the Petition for Reconsideration.  Thus, it did ―not intend to 
issue a decision on reconsideration of the 2008 Order until that decision [could] be made 
harmoniously with the current Quadrennial Regulatory Review.‖  Memorandum from Austin 
C. Schlick, FCC General Counsel, to Marcia M. Waldron, Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit 1 (Nov. 25, 2009).  The Commission requested that we ―continue to hold 
these cases in abeyance.‖  Id.  It asked that, in the alternative, we ―remand the 2008 Order to 
the Commission so that it may revisit the determinations made in that order in conjunction 
with‖ its 2010 Quadrennial Review.  Id. at 2.12  We declined to do either, and in March 2010 
we lifted the stay and set a briefing schedule for the consolidated cases pending before us. 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 We have jurisdiction over the rule-making portions of the FCC‘s 2008 Order under 47 
U.S.C. § 402(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1).
13
   
                                              
11
 As in Prometheus I, we use this designation to refer to those petitioners who have raised 
anti-deregulatory challenges to the Commission‘s 2008 Order.  These petitioners are Free 
Press; Media Alliance; Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ, Inc. 
(―UCC‖); and Prometheus Radio Project.     
12
 Specifically, the FCC asked that we ―treat [its] alternative request as a formal motion for 
voluntary remand.‖ Id. at 5 n.2. 
13
 Although all of the challenges to the FCC‘s 2008 Order were initially consolidated, we 
recognized that the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction to review 
FCC broadcast licensing actions under 47 U.S.C. § 402(b).  Thus, we bifurcated the licensing 
challenges and transferred them back to the D.C. Circuit.  Order Deconsolidating Licensing 
Appeals under § 402(b), Feb. 8, 2010. 
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A. Standard of Review under the APA 
In reviewing agency rulemaking, our standard of review is governed by the APA, 5 
U.S.C. § 706.  Under this standard, we must ―hold unlawful and set aside agency action, 
findings, and conclusions‖ that are ―arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law . . . [or] unsupported by substantial evidence.‖ Id. § 706(2)(a).  As 
the Supreme Court elaborated in Motor Vehicles Manufacturing Association of the United 
States v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (―State Farm‖): 
The scope of review under the arbitrary and capricious standard 
is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of 
the agency.  Nevertheless, the agency must examine the relevant 
data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action[,] 
including a rational connection between the facts found and the 
choices made. . . . Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary 
and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which 
Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to 
consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an 
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence 
before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be 
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency 
expertise.    
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
14
  
B.  Standard of Review under Subsection 202(h)  
Subsection 202(h) of the 1996 Telecommunications Act requires the Commission to 
determine whether media concentration rules are ―necessary in the public interest as the 
result of competition‖ and to ―repeal or modify any regulation it determines to be no longer 
in the public interest.‖  § 202(h), 110 Stat. at 111-12.15  In Prometheus I, we set out our 
                                              
14
 Moreover, ―[w]e may not supply a reasoned basis for the agency‘s action that the agency 
itself has not given. . . . We will, however, uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the 
agency‘s path may reasonably be discerned.‖  Id. at 43 (internal quotations and citations 
omitted).   
15
 Section 202(h) of the 1996 Telecommunications Act states the following:  ―Further 
Commission Review:  The Commission shall review its rules . . . and shall determine whether 
any of such rules are necessary in the public interest as the result of competition.  The 
Commission shall repeal or modify any regulation it determines no longer to be in the public 
19 
 
standard of review under § 202(h) in detail.  373 F.3d 390-97.  With no need to repeat that 
detail here, we note our summary of the § 202(h) standard: 
In a periodic review under § 202(h), the Commission is required 
to determine whether its then-extant rules remain useful in the 
public interest; if no longer useful, they must be repealed or 
modified.  Yet no matter what the Commission decides to do to 
any particular rule—retain, repeal, or modify (whether to make 
more or less stringent)—it must do so in the public interest and 
support its decision with a reasoned analysis. 
Id. at 395.  As we did in Prometheus I, ―[w]e shall evaluate each aspect of the Commission‘s 
Order accordingly.‖  Id.  
III. NEWSPAPER/BROADCAST CROSS-OWNERSHIP (“NBCO”) RULE 
All sides challenge the Commission‘s decision to repeal its ban on 
newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership in favor of a case-by-case approach guided by 
presumptions and a four-factor test.  Citizen Petitioners argue that the FCC failed to provide 
adequate notice of the rule as required by the APA, that elements of the rule are unsupported 
by the record evidence, and that several components are too vague and ill-defined to be 
enforceable or to promote the public interest.  In contrast, Deregulatory Petitioners
16
 contend 
that the FCC erred by failing to relax the rule further.  They also challenge the validity of the 
rule under our Constitution‘s First and Fifth Amendments.  Several of the Petitioners point to 
record evidence that they believe the FCC did not adequately consider in promulgating the 
new NBCO rule.  Because we conclude that the Commission did not meet the APA‘s notice 
and comment requirements for this rule, we do not reach any of these challenges to its 
substance. 
                                                                                                                                                  
interest.‖  Id.  We, along with the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, have upheld the 
Commission‘s interpretation of ―necessary‖ to mean ―convenient,‖ ―useful,‖ or ―helpful,‖ 
rather than ―indispensable.‖  Prometheus I, 373 F.3d at 393-94 (citing Cellco P’ship v. FCC, 
357 F.3d 88 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).   
16
 We refer to the following petitioners collectively as the ―Deregulatory Petitioners‖:  Belo 
Corporation; Bonneville International Corporation; CBS Broadcasting, Inc.; CBS 
Corporation; Clear Channel Communications, Inc.; Coalition of Smaller Market Television 
Stations; Cox Enterprises, Inc.; Fox Television Stations, Inc.; Gannett Company, Inc.; Media 
General Inc.; Morris Communications Company, LLC; National Association of Broadcasters; 
Newspaper Association of America; Raycom Media Inc.; Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc.; The 
Scranton Times, L.P.; and the Tribune Company. 
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A.  Notice and Comment Process  
In remanding the Commission‘s cross-media limits in Prometheus I, we advised that 
―any new ‗metric‘ for measuring diversity and competition in a market be made subject to 
public notice and comment before it is incorporated into a final rule.‖  373 F.3d at 412.  The 
FCC‘s ―decision to withhold‖ its previous metric (the Diversity Index) from ―public scrutiny 
was not without prejudice‖ to the public‘s ability to discuss and rebut it during comment, as 
evidenced by its significant flaws, and the Commission thus should have noticed the 
methodology publicly.  Id.  We noted that our remand would ―give[] the Commission an 
opportunity to cure its questionable notice.‖  Id. at 411. 
Two years after our remand, in July 2006, the FCC issued a Further Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking (―FNPR‖) to begin its 2006 Quadrennial Review and to request 
comments on how to address our remand.  2006 Quadrennial Regulatory Review—Review of 
the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 
202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 21 
F.C.C.R. 8834, 2006 WL 2067989 (July 24, 2006).  The FNPR contained only the following 
paragraph directly relevant to revising the NBCO rule: 
We invite comment on all of the issues remanded by the 
Prometheus court regarding cross-ownership.  Many of these 
issues relate to the [Diversity Index (―DI‖)].  In light of the 
court‘s extensive and detailed criticism of the DI, we tentatively 
conclude that the DI is an inaccurate tool for measuring 
diversity.  Moreover, we recognize that some aspects of 
diversity may be difficult to quantify.  To the extent that we will 
not use the DI to justify changes to the existing cross-ownership 
rules, we seek comment on how we should approach cross-
ownership limits.  Should limits vary depending upon the 
characteristics of local markets?  If so, what characteristics 
should be considered, and how should they be factored into any 
limits?  We seek comment on the newspaper/broadcast rule and 
the radio/television cross-ownership rule.  Are there aspects of 
television and radio broadcast operations that make cross-
ownership with a newspaper different for each of these media?  
If so, should limits on newspaper/radio combinations be 
different from limits on newspaper/television combinations?  
Lastly, are the newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rule and 
the radio/television cross-ownership rule necessary in the public 
interest as a result of competition? 
21 
 
FNPR ¶ 32 (emphasis added).   
Two commissioners dissented in part from the order adopting the FNPR, criticizing its 
―vague,‖ ―open-ended‖ nature and its failure to discuss proposals to foster minority and 
female ownership, among other ―major flaws‖ and ―infirmities.‖  Statement of Commissioner 
Jonathan S. Adelstein, Concurring in Part, Dissenting in Part, 21 F.C.C.R. 8834, 8865-67, 
2006 WL 2067989 (July 24, 2006).  Commissioner Adelstein noted that the FNPR failed to 
give notice regarding any new metric for measuring diversity and that the Commission had 
not committed to allowing public comment before such a measuring device would be 
incorporated into ―rules that are likely to change the media landscape for generations to 
come.‖  Id. at 8866.  Commissioner Copps similarly noted: ―A transparent process is 
especially critical for issues of this magnitude when the Notice asks broad, general questions 
. . . .  I do not see how we can be transparent and comply with the dictates of the Third 
Circuit [in Prometheus I] without letting the American people know about and comment on 
any new standards of measurement that we adopt in developing our ultimate decision.‖  
Statement of Commissioner Michael J. Copps, Concurring in Part, Dissenting in Part, 21 
F.C.C.R. 8834, 8863, 2006 WL 2067989 (July 24, 2006).   
Despite the brevity of the relevant portion of the FNPR, the FCC relied entirely on the 
two sentences emphasized in this single paragraph as providing adequate notice of the new 
NBCO rule adopted in its 2008 Order.  FCC Br. 37.  As its counsel reiterated at oral 
argument:  ―I want to emphasize that for APA purposes we think that Paragraph 32 of the 
further notice was sufficient, because all we have, all the agency is required to do is [set out] 
general issues.‖  Oral Argument Transcript (―Tr.‖) 92; see also Tr. 87 (―Well[,] Paragraph 32 
of the further notice . . . does have two sentences, but sentences that talk specifically to this 
question relevant to newspaper broadcast co-ownership.‖).  Only when pressed at oral 
argument did counsel add that the 2003 Order and our decision in Prometheus I provided 
useful background for interested parties, but he stopped short of asserting that the FNPR 
incorporated the entire record that preceded it:  ―Indeed, I would say that . . . parties who are 
interested in any of these issues should have paid attention, not only to the Commission‘s 
2003 order but to this court‘s opinion and to its instructions on remand in order to figure out 
what the Commission was going to deal with and had to deal with in the 2008 Order, because 
that was indeed in part a response to this court‘s order on remand.‖  Tr. 94-95. 
Following publication of the FNPR, there was an initial 90-day comment period and a 
further 60 days for reply comments.  However, after that period, the procedures followed by 
the Commission were irregular.  On November 22, 2006, the Commission announced that it 
had commissioned 10 economic studies.  Both of the Commissioners who had dissented from 
the FNPR issued statements criticizing ―the [poor] transparency of the process undertaken to 
develop the studies and select the authors,‖ ―the truncated period of time to complete the 
22 
 
studies,‖ and the peer review process proposed.  News Release, FCC, Commissioner 
Adelstein’s Comments on the FCC’s Media Ownership Studies (Nov. 22, 2006); News 
Release, FCC, Commissioner Copps’ Comments on the FCC’s Media Ownership Studies 
(Nov. 22, 2006).   
On July 31, 2007, the FCC released the 10 studies (and large underlying data sets) and 
asked for comments on those studies to be filed 60 days later, with 15 additional days to 
submit reply comments.  In a joint statement, Commissioners Copps and Adelstein criticized 
the short time for public comment given the volume of data released and raised questions 
about the peer review process.
17
  In September 2007, about halfway through the comment 
period, the Commission released peer review analyses of the ownership studies and some 
additional underlying data.  A few days later, Free Press, Consumer Federation of America, 
and Consumers Union filed a complaint with the Commission under the Data Quality Act 
(―DQA‖), 44 U.S.C. § 3516.  Free Press et al., Complaint under the DQA and Motion for 
Extension of Time (Sept. 11, 2007) (―First DQA Complaint‖).  It alleged that the Commission 
had (1) suppressed studies with results contrary to its purportedly predetermined goal of 
relaxing the ownership rules;
18
 (2) violated the Office of Management and Budget‘s 
guidelines under the DQA, as well as the FCC‘s own guidelines implementing the DQA, 
because the FCC‘s peer review process was ―woefully inadequate‖ and the results of its 
commissioned studies were not reproducible; and (3) failed to give peer reviewers and the 
public enough time to comment on the studies.  Id.  On November 1, 2007, the last day for 
reply comments on the studies, the FCC posted to its website several additional peer review 
comments, ―revised‖ versions of four of the studies, and new peer review studies, but did not 
extend the time for public comment.  Free Press, Consumer Federation of America, and 
Consumers Union responded by filing a second complaint alleging continued violations of 
the DQA and the APA.  Free Press et al., Second Complaint under the DQA and Motion for 
Extension of Time (Nov. 9, 2007). 
                                              
17
 ―These are ten supposedly serious studies put together by teams of economists and analysts 
over an eight month period,‖ the dissenting Commissioners noted, ―[y]et the Commission 
expects the public to analyze all ten studies, and reams of underlying data, and file comments 
60 days from today!  This is unfair, unnecessary, and ultimately unwise . . . .‖  News Release, 
FCC, Joint Statement of Commissioners Michael J. Copps and Jonathan S. Adelstein on 
Release of Media Ownership Studies (July 31, 2007).  
18
 After allegations that two studies were suppressed, the Commission authorized an 
Inspector General investigation and released what is purportedly ―a controversial 
memorandum by [the] then-chief economist of the FCC that laid out a research strategy 
specifically designed to justify a preconceived goal—to repeal the newspaper-media cross-
ownership rule.‖  First DQA Complaint at 7.   
23 
 
Between October 2006 and November 2007, the Commission held six public hearings 
on media ownership in cities around the country.  Citizen Petitioners object to the manner in 
which the final public hearing, held on November 12, 2007, was handled, as the hearing date 
and location (Seattle, Washington) were announced just 10 calendar days beforehand.   
On November 13, 2007, then-FCC Chairman Kevin J. Martin published an Op-Ed in 
The New York Times unveiling his own proposal for a new NBCO rule.  He simultaneously 
put out a Press Release (together, the ―Op-Ed/Press Release‖) that set a 28-day deadline for 
the public  to ―comment‖ on his proposal.  Responses were due December 11, 2007.  
Commissioners Copps and Adelstein objected to his decision.
19
  On November 28, 2007, 
Chairman Martin circulated an internal draft of the Order to the other Commissioners.   
The Op-Ed/Press Release generated much criticism.  The Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the FCC‘s oversight committee in the Senate, 
approved by unanimous consent a bill that, among other provisions, required the FCC to 
delay its vote on the proposal until a meaningful notice and comment period occurred for the 
NBCO rule.  Media Ownership Act of 2007, S. 2332, 110th Cong. (2007).
20
  A similar bill 
was introduced in the House of Representatives.  Media Ownership Act of 2007, H.R. 4835, 
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 Their separate press release included the following statement regarding notice and 
comment: 
The Martin rules are clearly not ready for prime time.  Under the 
Chairman‘s timetable, we count 19 working days for public 
comment.  That is grossly insufficient.  The American people 
should have a minimum of 90 days to comment, just as many 
Members of Congress have requested. . . .  
There is still time to do this the right way.  Congress and the 
thousands of American citizens we have talked to want a 
thoughtful and deliberate rulemaking, not an alarming rush to 
judgment characterized by insultingly short notices for public 
hearings, inadequate time for public comment, flawed studies[,] 
and a tainted peer review process . . . . 
News Release, FCC, Joint Statement of Commissioners Copps and Adelstein on Chairman 
Martin’s Cross Ownership Proposal (Nov. 13, 2007).  They also disputed Chairman Martin‘s 
characterization of his proposed rule, noting that ―[t]he proposal could repeal the ban in every 
market in America, not just the top twenty . . . .‖  Id. 
20
 S. 2332 would have required FCC publication of any proposal to modify, revise, or amend 
its ownership rules, followed by a 60-day comment period and 30 days for reply comments. 
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110th Cong. (2007) .  On December 17, 2007, a bipartisan group of 25 Senators urged the 
FCC to delay its vote scheduled for the next day ―to provide a reasonable period for 
comment‖ ―that would normally accompany a rule change of this type,‖ and threatened to 
revoke the new NBCO rule legislatively if the vote went ahead.
21
  
The hours before the final vote were a scramble.  The 2008 Order was not circulated 
to the Commissioners until 9:44 p.m. the night before the vote.  Even that draft had sections 
missing.  The Commissioners received a new version of the NBCO rule at 1:57 a.m. on the 
day of the vote.  At 11:12 a.m. that same morning, another version of the NBCO rule was 
circulated that contained  revisions to the four-factor test that would be employed in every 
case.  Nevertheless, later that same day the Commission, by a three to two vote, adopted the 
2008 Order and the Diversity Order.
22
   
B. The FCC Failed to Meet the APA Notice and Comment Standard   
1. The APA Standard 
The APA requires agencies to provide notice of proposed rulemaking that contains 
―either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or description of the subjects and issues 
involved.‖  5 U.S.C. § 553(b).  Following notice, ―the agency shall give interested persons an 
opportunity to participate in the rulemaking through submission of written data, views, or 
arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation.‖  Id. § 553(c).  As we stated in 
Prometheus I, ―‗the adequacy of the notice must be tested by determining whether it would 
fairly apprise interested persons of the ‗subjects and issues‘ before the agency.‘‖  373 F.3d at 
411 (citing Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 568 F.2d 284, 293 (3d Cir. 1977)).
23
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 ―We believe this denies the American public any real ability for input and fails to reflect 
reasoned and transparent agency decision-making.  Furthermore, we know you are aware that 
the Senate Commerce Committee has unanimously passed a piece of legislation asking you to 
defer action on December 18
th
.  We believe you have shortchanged the comment process . . . 
.‖  Letter from 25 United States Senators to the FCC 1 (Dec. 14, 2007). 
22
 In a nearly unanimous voice vote, the United States Senate passed a joint resolution 
disapproving the NBCO rule.  S.J. Res. 28, 110th Cong. (2008). 
23
 The FCC also points us to the logical outgrowth doctrine to assess its compliance with the 
APA. FCC Br. 38.  Stated inversely, that doctrine asks if the ―substance of an agency‘s final 
rule strays too far from the description contained in the initial notice . . . .‖  Council Tree 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 619 F.3d 235, 249 (3d Cir. 2010).  If so, the final rule is not a 
―logical outgrowth‖ of the rule proposed in the notice, and ―the agency may have deprived 
interested persons of their statutory right to an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking.‖  
25 
 
To assess whether the public was fairly apprised of a new rule, a reviewing court asks 
―whether the purposes of notice and comment have been adequately served.‖ Am. Water 
Works Ass’n v. EPA, 40 F.3d 1266, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (internal quotation and citation 
omitted); see also Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 279 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2002).  
Among the purposes of the APA‘s notice and comment requirements are ―(1) to ensure that 
agency regulations are tested via exposure to diverse public comment, (2) to ensure fairness 
to affected parties, and (3) to give affected parties an opportunity to develop evidence in the 
record to support their objections to the rule and thereby enhance the quality of judicial 
review.‖  Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 407 F.3d 
1250, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 2005).  In addition, ―a chance to comment . . . [enables] the agency [to] 
maintain[] a flexible and open-minded attitude towards its own rules.‘‖  McLouth Steel 
Prods. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317, 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (internal citation omitted).  
To achieve those purposes,  
there must be an exchange of views, information, and criticism 
between interested persons and the agency. . . . Consequently, the 
notice required by the APA . . . must disclose in detail the thinking 
that has animated the form of a proposed rule and the data upon 
which that rule is based. . . . [A]n agency proposing informal 
rulemaking has an obligation to make its views known to the 
public in a concrete and focused form so as to make criticism or 
formulation of alternatives possible.  
Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35-36 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (emphasis added) (internal 
citations and footnotes omitted).    
In sum, ―[t]he opportunity for comment must be a meaningful opportunity.‖  Rural 
Cellular Ass’n v. FCC, 588 F.3d 1095, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 2009).  That means enough time with 
enough information to comment and for the agency to consider and respond to the comments. 
2. Analysis of Compliance with the APA Standard 
No party disputes that Chairman Martin‘s Op-Ed/Press Release did not satisfy the 
APA‘s notice requirements.  The proposal was not published in the Federal Register, the 
views expressed were those of one person and not the Commission, and the Commission 
                                                                                                                                                  
Id.  However, the doctrine appears not to apply here because the NBCO rule in the 2008 
Order is brand new.  ―The logical outgrowth doctrine does not extend to a final rule that is a 
brand new rule, since something is not a logical outgrowth of nothing . . . .‖  Id. at 250 
(internal quotations and citations omitted). 
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voted days after substantive responses were filed, allowing little opportunity for meaningful 
consideration of the responses before the final rule was adopted.  In effect conceding these 
points, the FCC states that the Op-Ed/Press Release is ―immaterial‖ to its compliance with 
the APA‘s notice requirement.  FCC Br. 38 n.10.  
As noted earlier, the Commission relies on paragraph 32 of the FNPR to satisfy its 
notice obligations under the APA.  Id. at 37.  It argues that ―[a] notice that contains no rule 
proposals complies with the APA so long as it is ‗sufficient to fairly apprise interested parties 
of all significant subjects and issues involved.‘‖  Id. (quoting NVE, Inc. v. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 436 F.3d 182, 191 (3d Cir. 2006)).  However, an agency also ―must ‗describe 
the range of alternatives being considered with reasonable specificity.  Otherwise, interested 
parties will not know what to comment on, and notice will not lead to better-informed agency 
decision-making.‘‖  Horsehead Res. Dev. Co., Inc. v. Browner, 16 F.3d 1246, 1268 (D.C. 
Cir. 1994) (internal citations omitted).   
On these facts, we cannot conclude that the Commission met this obligation, as we fail 
to see how the FNPR, with its two general questions related to the NBCO rule, and the 
irregular comment period that followed, satisfy the APA.  The FNPR makes plain that the 
FCC was planning significant revision to the NBCO rule and looking for an alternative to the 
Diversity Index for measuring diversity.  Paragraph 32 of the FNPR asks only whether cross-
ownership limits should vary ―depending upon the characteristics of local markets,‖ and, ―if 
so, what characteristics should be considered . . . ?‖   
While the new rule varies limits depending on characteristics of markets—
specifically, market size and the number of media voices—it was not clear from the FNPR 
which characteristics the Commission was considering or why.  The phrase ―characteristics 
of markets‖ was too open-ended to allow for meaningful comment on the Commission‘s 
approach.  In addition, many central elements of the rule are not based on ―characteristics of 
markets‖ at all.  For example, key aspects of the rule rely on: the amount of ―local news‖ 
produced by an individual station involved in a potential merger and how that term is 
defined; the definition of ―major media voices,‖ including what counts as a major newspaper; 
how ―market concentration‖ is measured; whether a station is ―failing‖; whether a station 
exercises ―independent news judgment‖ and how that term is defined; and whether a case-by-
case approach or a categorical approach to proposed mergers would better serve the public 
interest.  The FNPR also did not solicit comment on the overall framework under 
consideration, how potential factors might operate together, or how the new approach might 
affect the FCC‘s other ownership rules.  These were significant omissions.  
Our dissenting colleague suggests that the FNPR subsumes the entire record 
surrounding the 2002 Biennial Review, including the 2002 Notice, the 2003 Order, and our 
decision in Prometheus I.  As noted above, the FCC did not argue this.  Rather, it contended 
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that ―the four corners of [the FNPR were] sufficient‖ under the APA.  Tr. 88.  But even if the 
FNPR implicitly incorporated those sources, it still did not provide sufficient notice of the 
Commission‘s new approach to cross-ownership.  During the 2006 Quadrennial Review, the 
FCC departed entirely from its approach in the 2003 Order and adopted a rule with 
significant elements that were not previously noticed in 2002
24
 or analyzed in the 2003 Order 
or our remand.  Although it was clear from those sources, taken together, that the 
Commission was planning to overhaul its approach to newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership, 
they did not contain enough information about what it was planning to do, or the options it 
was considering, to provide the public with a meaningful opportunity to comment.  Until 
Chairman Martin‘s November 2007 personal Op-Ed/Press Release, the public did not know 
even what options he was considering, let alone the Commission.  
In further support of our conclusion, we note that the FNPR is sparse in comparison to 
the Commission‘s May 2010 Notice of Inquiry initiating its 2010 Quadrennial Review of the 
ownership rules.  See 2010 Quadrennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Commission’s 
Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Notice of Inquiry, 25 F.C.C.R. 6086, 2010 WL 2110771 
(May 25, 2010) (the ―2010 NOI‖).  The 2010 NOI is much more specific and covers many 
more issues.  It contains many pages of questions regarding potential approaches to the 
NBCO rule, discusses data motivating the Commission‘s questions, and inquires into various 
regulatory options.  For example, it asks:  
With regard to the newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rule, 
should the Commission treat newspaper-television combinations 
differently from newspaper-radio combinations, as we do in the 
2006 presumptive standard?  Are some goals or metrics more 
relevant for one or the other type of combinations?  Are particular 
market participants more heavily affected by the rule?  Which 
elements of market structure are most important for measuring the 
effects of this rule on our policy goals?  Would relaxing the 
newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rule result in economies of 
scale and scope that could help newspapers to survive?  
                                              
24
 We note that the FNPR contrasts with the 2002 Notice, which ―outline[d] . . . a variety of 
different approaches that might serve the public interest,‖ 2002 Notice ¶ 34, and sought 
comment on them, while the FNPR did not present options or seek comment on different 
approaches.  Compare 2002 Notice ¶¶ 34-53 with FNPR ¶¶ 28-32.  Even with that, we still 
expressed concerns in Prometheus I about the 2002 Notice because of the FCC‘s failure to 
notice the methodology underlying its approach to cross-ownership in the 2003 Order.  373 
F.3d at 411-12. 
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Alternatively, do the problems faced by newspapers result from 
extraneous factors that make relief in this area irrelevant?  For 
example, statistics show that fewer people are reading newspapers 
and, instead, are increasingly getting news and information from 
nontraditional sources.  Statistics also demonstrate an increase in 
the degree of penetration of new media, including online websites, 
and social media.  Given the fragmentation of sources of news, 
would structural relief help newspapers sufficiently to result in a 
net gain in local news and information?  Should any such relief 
operate via a revised rule or via a waiver standard?  If the latter, 
what type of waiver standard should be applicable?  Is the 
presumptive standard adopted in the 2006 Quadrennial Review 
Order able to further our competition, diversity, and localism 
goals as well as result in economies of scale and scope that could 
help newspapers survive?  Is a rule that relies on presumptions 
preferable in order to achieve our goals?  What factors should a 
relaxed rule or waiver standard take into account?  Should any 
relaxation of the rule continue to account for the number of voices 
in a community?  For instance, is there a basis in the current 
marketplace for finding that cross-ownerships only in the largest 
markets would be in the public interest?  Should it take into 
account market share of the media entities that would be 
combined?  If the number of voices is relevant, how should voices 
be defined for this purpose?  
2010 NOI  ¶ 87; see also id. at ¶¶ 90-100 (detailing ―structural‖ inquiries regarding use of 
―bright line rules,‖ ―case-by-case approach,‖ ―hybrid approach,‖ and ―broad cross-media 
approach‖); id. at ¶¶ 101-06 (inquiring into effect of ―digital contours‖ and ―national 
broadband plan‖ on NBCO and other ownership rules).  
Moreover, a comparison of the comments submitted during the official comment 
period (July 24, 2006 - January 16, 2007) and the responses to the Chairman‘s Op-Ed/Press 
Release (November 13, 2007 - December 11, 2007) indicates that interested parties were 
prejudiced by the inadequacy of the FNPR.  During the official comment period, some 
commenters noted that their submission would be limited because the FNPR ―makes no 
proposals and suggests no options.‖  Comments of UCC et al., MB Docket No. 06-121 at 60 
(Oct. 23, 2006) (―10/23/06 UCC Comments‖).  Indeed, in an 87-page submission, there was 
only one paragraph on how a relaxed approach to cross-ownership ―might work‖ if the FCC 
eliminated the existing ban, but over 11 pages discussing data on the benefits of retaining a 
ban and several more pages regarding closing ―loopholes‖ in the ban.  10/23/06 UCC 
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Comments at 61-74.  These comments, like many others, were largely limited to discussing 
whether the ban should be retained or eliminated.  See, e.g.,  Comments of Bonneville 
International Corp., MB Docket No. 06-121 at 15 (Oct. 23, 2006) (arguing that the ban 
should be eliminated); Comments of Belo Corp., MB Docket No. 06-121 at 9-10 (Oct. 23, 
2006) (same); Comments of AFL-CIO, MB Docket No. 06-121 at 57 (Oct. 23, 2006) (urging 
retention of the ban); Comments of American Federation of Radio and Television Artists, MB 
Docket No. 06-121 at 20-22 (Oct. 23, 2006) (same).  This occurred, we suspect, in large 
measure because a discussion of the actual issues involved—including the factors, 
presumptions, and exceptions the FCC was considering—was impossible based on the sparse 
FNPR.   
In contrast, responses to Chairman Martin‘s Op-Ed/Press Release began to raise for 
the first time substantive issues with his new approach to cross-ownership.  For example, the 
response submitted by Consumers Union, Consumer Federation of America and Free Press 
on December 11, 2007 (―12/11/07 Response‖) began to discuss the following issues, among 
others, that had not been noticed in the FNPR: the eight-voices test and considerations 
regarding how it should be employed in a newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rule; options 
for how market concentration should be measured if it is to be used as a factor in allowing 
mergers (which they argue is a new ―metric‖ that had to be noticed under Prometheus I and 
was still too vague in the Op-Ed/Press Release for a meaningful response); the implications 
of the distinction between increased local news on a particular station (or merged entity) and 
increased local news production in the overall market (which they argue should be the 
appropriate level of analysis); and other perceived ambiguities in Chairman Martin‘s 
proposal that they argued could change the effects of the rule considerably depending on how 
various terms are defined and how the factors and presumptions work together.  12/11/07 
Response at 12-39.  Regardless whether the FCC eventually rejected the views expressed in 
those responses (as it would have been free to do after considering them fully and with 
plausible reasoning after adequate notice), they merit consideration in a rulemaking of great 
public concern. 
The APA requires that the public have a meaningful opportunity to submit data and 
written analysis regarding a proposed rulemaking.  5 U.S.C. § 553(c).  Yet, commenters did 
not have sufficient time to do so after the Op-Ed/Press Release.  The Chairman gave only 28 
days for response, not the usual 90 days.  As Consumers Union, Consumer Federation of 
America, and Free Press stated, ―[s]ince the time frame allowed for a response to the 
Chairman‘s off-the-cuff proposal was short, we rely primarily on the evidence already in the 
record.‖  12/11/07 Response at 17.  After the FCC began to formulate an approach to this 
important and complex rule, the public was entitled to ―a new opportunity to comment‖ in 
which ―commenters would [] have their first occasion to offer new and different criticisms 
which the Agency might find convincing.‖ BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637, 
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642 (1st Cir. 1979); see also Natural Res. Def. Council, 279 F.3d at 1186. 
In addition, the FCC had an obligation to remain ―open-minded‖ about the issues 
raised and engage with the substantive responses submitted.  Rural Cellular Ass’n, 588 F.3d 
at 1101 (―in order to satisfy [the APA], an agency must . . . remain sufficiently open-
minded‖); McLouth Steel Products, 838 F.2d at 1325.  The timeline reveals, however, that 
the Commission could not have done so.  Two weeks before the Chairman‘s response period 
closed, and before most of the responses were received, a draft of the order was circulated 
internally.  The final vote occurred within a week of the response deadline.  This is not the 
agency engagement the APA contemplates.  
In this context, we have little choice but to conclude that the FCC did not, through the 
FNPR, fulfill its ―obligation to make its views known to the public in a concrete and focused 
form so as to make criticism or formulation of alternatives possible.‖  Home Box Office, 567 
F.2d at 36.  The two sentences in paragraph 32 of the FNPR are simply too general and open-
ended to have fairly apprised the public of the Commission‘s new approach to cross-
ownership.  Criticism and the formulation of alternative options only began to be possible 
after the Chairman‘s Op-Ed/Press Release, and there is no dispute  those documents did not 
satisfy the APA‘s requirements.  For these reasons, we vacate and remand the NBCO rule for 
failure to comply with the APA‘s notice and comment requirements.25  We expect the 
Commission to comply with this remand in the context of its ongoing 2010 Quadrennial 
Review.
26
    
C.  Permanent Waivers of Cross-Ownership Rule 
In its 2008 Order, the FCC granted five permanent waivers of its NBCO rule—one to 
Gannett Company, Inc.‘s newspaper/broadcast combination in Phoenix, Arizona, and four to 
Media General, Inc.‘s combinations in  Myrtle Beach-Florence, South Carolina; Columbus, 
                                              
25
 Because we vacate the NBCO rule in the 2008 Order, the rule in existence prior to that 
order will remain in effect until the FCC promulgates new cross-ownership regulations.  See, 
e.g., Council Tree, 619 F.3d at 258 (―vacating [an FCC] rule will mean that‖ the prior rule 
―will once again‖ govern the regulated activity);  Abington Mem. Hosp. v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 
242, 244 (3d Cir. 1984) (―vacating or rescinding invalidly promulgated regulations has the 
effect of reinstating prior regulations‖) (citing Action on Smoking and Health v. CAB, 713 
F.2d 795, 797 (D.C. Cir. 1983)); Paulsen v. Daniels, 413 F.3d 999, 1008 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(―The effect of invalidating an agency rule is to reinstate the rule previously in force.‖). 
26
 We note our dissenting colleague‘s concern that the 2010 Quadrennial Review be allowed 
―to run its course.‖  Nothing in our decision today prevents the FCC from fulfilling its 
obligations on remand in the course of that ongoing review.   
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Georgia; Panama City, Florida; and in the Tri-Cities DMA in Tennessee/Virginia.  2008 
Order ¶ 77.  Temporary waivers for these combinations were pending when the quadrennial 
review proceeding ended.  The FCC justified its decision to grant these waivers on the 
ground that it took similar action in 1975, when it grandfathered certain combinations while 
imposing an outright ban.  Id.  It stated that ―divestiture introduces the possibility of 
disruption for the industry and hardship for individual owners,‖ and asserted that ―the public 
interest warrants a waiver [in these cases] in light of the synergies that have already been 
achieved from the newspaper/broadcast station combination[s].‖  Id. (quotations and 
footnotes omitted).   
Citizen Petitioners disagree, arguing that these waivers are unprecedented in number 
and scope.  They also contend that the waivers are not analogous to those granted in 1975 
because the combinations here were acquired in a post-regulatory world (that had been 
characterized by a complete ban before the mergers occurred).  Although we have several 
concerns about these permanent waivers,
27
 we conclude that we do not have jurisdiction to 
reach the merits of Citizen Petitioners‘ claims.   
Under 47 U.S.C. § 405(a), a party seeking judicial review of an FCC ―order, decision, 
report, or action‖ must file a petition for reconsideration if it ―(1) was not a party to the 
proceedings resulting in such order, decision, report, or action, or (2) relies on questions of 
fact or law upon which the Commission . . . has been afforded no opportunity to pass.‖  It is 
undisputed that Citizen Petitioners did not file a petition for reconsideration of the FCC‘s 
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  Between 1975 (the year the newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership ban went into 
effect) and 2008 the FCC granted a total of four waivers.  In the 2008 Order, it granted five, 
without articulating the standard it applied.  We doubt that the Commission had the 
opportunity to consider fully the merits of the waivers—indeed, some of the Commissioners 
only had 12 hours‘ notice that the waivers would be included, as they were not added to the 
draft Order nor circulated to the full Commission until the night before the vote.  This is 
particularly troubling because, by the FCC‘s own standards, the combinations are significant. 
Media General combined a top-four ranked network-affiliated television station and a daily 
newspaper in each of its four markets.  As the FCC recognizes, top-four stations are ―the 
most influential providers of local news [in a] market,‖ and combinations involving them 
pose a heightened threat to diversity.  Id. at ¶ 61.  Similarly, Gannett acquired a top-ranked 
broadcast station and a daily newspaper.   
We also have concerns about the propriety of the decision-making process.  In the 10 
months before the 2008 Order was adopted, representatives of Media General (which 
received four of the five waivers) visited or called the Commission 37 times.  See Media 
General Notice of Ex Parte Communication, MB Docket Nos. 06-121 and 02-277 (Nov. 20, 
2007). 
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grant of the waivers before seeking judicial review.  Because we conclude that the FCC has 
not been afforded an opportunity to pass on Citizen Petitioners‘ objections to the permanent 
waivers, they have failed to meet the requirements of § 405(a)(2) and we lack jurisdiction to 
hear their challenge.
28
   
Citizen Petitioners‘ arguments that the objections were before the Commission, or in 
the alternative that administrative exhaustion would be futile, do not persuade us otherwise.  
First, the Citizen Petitioners contend that, because the waivers were placed in the draft order 
the night before the vote, the Commission had the opportunity to consider the dissenting 
Commissioners‘ objections to granting the waivers, which are substantially similar to  Citizen 
Petitioners‘ objections.  Citizen Petitioners Reply Br. 23.  They cite Office of Communication 
of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 465 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1972), in which judicial review 
was not precluded by § 405 because ―the dissenting Commissioners . . . raise[d] the very 
argument pressed . . . by the [petitioners],‖ and thus  the argument ―was surely before the 
Commissioners at the time of their decision.‖  Id. at 523.   
We believe that case is distinguishable.  Here, it is far from clear whether the full 
Commission considered the dissenters‘ arguments given the brief time for discussion 
between the introduction of the waivers into the Order and the vote.  In addition, the two 
dissenting Commissioners‘ arguments against the waivers were short (one to two sentences 
each) and focused on the process by which these waivers were adopted rather than their 
substance.  See Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Michael J. Copps, 23 F.C.C.R. at 
2116 ; Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Jonathan S. Adelstein, 23 F.C.C.R. at 2124.  
Second, Citizen Petitioners argue that it would be futile for them to seek 
reconsideration because the FCC majority has refused to address the concerns of the 
dissenting Commissioners and Common Cause, which filed a petition for reconsideration 
challenging the permanent waivers in March 2008.  See Petition for Reconsideration.  We are 
skeptical that the facts here establish the futility of reconsideration such that this rare 
exception should apply.   
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 The FCC and Deregulatory Petitioners argue that, if section 405(a) does not bar our 
review, we should construe Citizen Petitioners‘ challenge to the waivers as an objection to a 
licensing proceeding over which the D.C. Circuit Court has exclusive jurisdiction under 
section 402(b).  Because the waivers were granted as a part of the 2008 Order, which does 
not grant or deny any licenses, we arguably have jurisdiction to hear Citizen Petitioners‘ 
claims.  However, because they have failed to exhaust their remedies under section 405(a), 
we need not reach this claim.   
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It is true that the waiver requests had been before the FCC for some time prior to the 
2008 Order.  Media General and Gannett acquired the combinations at issue prior to 2001.  
2008 Order ¶ 77.  They then requested temporary waivers during their license renewal 
proceedings.  Free Press, a Citizen Petitioner, filed objections to the waiver requests.  Those 
proceedings were still pending at the time the 2008 Order was issued.  Subsequently, the 
FCC granted the license renewals and found that the issue of the temporary waivers had been 
rendered moot by the 2008 Order, which granted permanent waivers and thus effectively 
concluded the adjudicatory license-renewal proceedings.  Free Press filed a timely petition 
for review of those license renewals in April 2008, which remains pending after more than 
three years. 
Citizen Petitioners argue that the FCC is playing an administrative ―shell game,‖ and 
has denied Free Press‘s right to be heard by failing to address in the 2008 Order its licensing 
renewal objections when the Commission granted the waivers, and now failing to pass on 
Free Press‘s petition for review of the licenses.  Citizen Petitioners Reply Br. 27.  Even 
though the Commission failed to respond to the initial objections of Free Press, and has not 
acted on its petition for review of the license renewals, this is not the proceeding in which 
Free Press may seek relief from those decisions.  Rather, it must challenge the FCC‘s 
licensing decisions in the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which has exclusive 
jurisdiction over licensing proceedings under 47 U.S.C. § 402(b).   
Third, that Common Cause (not a party to this action) filed a petition for 
reconsideration on which the FCC has yet to pass does not resolve matters.  Citizen 
Petitioners claim that the lapse of time between that filing and this litigation (three years) 
demonstrates that the FCC has had the opportunity to rule on these arguments, and that 
further delaying judicial review is futile.  Citizen Petitioners Reply Br. 23.  Though a close 
question, we disagree.  While at some time the FCC‘s delay in deciding Common Cause‘s 
petition would establish the futility of requiring administrative exhaustion, we do not think 
that time is now, as the FCC has informed us that it intends to consider Common Cause‘s 
petition ―harmoniously with the [2010] Quadrennial Review.‖  Memorandum from Austin C. 
Schlick, FCC General Counsel, to Marcia M. Waldron, Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit 1 (Nov. 25, 2009).
29
   
In this context, we conclude that we do not have jurisdiction to hear the Citizen 
Petitioner‘s challenge of these permanent waivers. 
                                              
29
 Though we do not believe that enough time has elapsed for reconsideration to be rendered 
futile, such a time may come if, for example, the FCC fails to act by its self-imposed 
deadline.   
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IV.  RADIO/TELEVISION CROSS-OWNERSHIP RULE 
In the 2008 Order, the FCC retained its radio/television cross-ownership rule initially 
adopted in 1999.  In 2003, however, it determined that the rule was no longer necessary 
because the combination of the local ownership rules and the cross-media limits would 
provide sufficient protection of viewpoint diversity.  FCC Br. 70.  However, we invalidated 
the cross-media limits in Prometheus I because the Commission failed to ―provide a reasoned 
analysis to support the limits that it chose.‖  373 F.3d at 397.  Thus, in the 2008 Order the 
FCC found it necessary to ―adopt diversity protections to act in their place,‖ and opted to 
retain the 1999 rule.  2008 Order ¶ 82.     
 That rule is that a party may: own up to two television stations and up to six radio 
stations, or one television station and seven radio stations, in a market where at least 20 
independently owned media ―voices‖ would remain post-merger; two television stations and 
up to four radio stations in a market where 10 independently owned media ―voices‖ would 
remain; or two television stations and one radio station regardless of the number of media 
voices in the market.  Id. at ¶ 80 n.259.  Combinations that are otherwise permissible under 
this rule also may be limited by the local television and radio ownership rules.  Id.   
 Only Deregulatory Petitioners challenge the retention of this rule.  The National 
Association of Broadcasters (―NAB‖) and CBS argue that the FCC fails to provide an 
explanation for why the rule is necessary and sufficient to protect diversity of ownership in 
light of the existence of the local ownership rules that also protect diversity.  NAB Br. 60-61; 
CBS Br. 20-21.  We disagree, as the Commission has provided a reasoned explanation of its 
decision:   
The record does not indicate that local radio and television 
ownership limits provide sufficient protection to assure a 
diversity of viewpoints in those media markets.  Local service-
specific limits are chiefly concerned with competition and 
rivalry among entities providing the same service.  In contrast, 
cross-ownership rules aim to maintain a vibrant marketplace of 
ideas to ensure a diversity of editorial content. What the 
Commission said in 1999 remains true today – the fact that 
‗[t]he public continues to rely on both radio and television for 
news and information‘ supports the conclusion that ‗the two 
media both contribute to the ‗marketplace of ideas‘ and compete 
in the same diversity market.‘  Because the two media ‗serve as 
substitutes at least to some degree for diversity purposes,‘ there 
remains a need to retain a cross-ownership rule ‗to ensure that 
viewpoint diversity is adequately protected.‘ 
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2008 Order ¶ 84 (citations omitted). 
NAB also argues that diversity of ownership does not necessarily promote viewpoint 
diversity—and may have the opposite effect.  NAB Br. 60-61.  Although the FCC does not 
dispute this, it notes that the record contained ―evidence that commonly owned media outlets 
can also share (and promote) the same viewpoint.‖  FCC Br. 71 (citing 2008 Order ¶ 49).  It 
noted further that the record provides examples of ―existing media outlets, such as 
newspapers, introducing a new media outlet into the market, such as an Internet website, but 
using both outlets to provide the same local content for consumers.‖  2008 Order ¶ 49 (citing 
Comments of Consumers Union, et al., MB Docket No. 06-121 at 136-47 (Oct. 1, 2007); 
Comments of AFL-CIO, MB Docket No. 06-121 at 24-26, 28-29, 32 (Oct. 23, 2006) (stating 
that cross-owned media properties serve as cross-promotional vehicles rather than as 
independent editorial voices, citing examples in Austin, Texas and Los Angeles, California); 
Comments of American Federation of Television and Radio Artists, MB Docket No. 06-121 
at 21-22 (Oct. 23, 2006) (stating that media conglomerates impose homogenous editorial 
views across commonly owned property)).  We believe that, in this light, the FCC plausibly 
justified its position that ―‗diversification of ownership would enhance the possibility of 
achieving greater diversity of viewpoints.‘‖  FCC Br. 71 (quoting FCC v. Nat’l Citizens 
Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 796 (1978) (―NCCB‖)). 
 CBS asserts that the rule is no longer in the public interest in light of record evidence 
that the media market is growing more diverse and competitive.  CBS Br. 23-27.   While the 
FCC acknowledged this trend, it found that ―traditional media . . . are the most frequently 
used and most important sources of local and national news . . . .‖  2008 Order ¶ 57.  
Although CBS claims that a ―revolution‖ has transpired ―in the media marketplace,‖ CBS Br. 
21, the record supports the FCC‘s conclusion that new media such as the Internet and cable 
still do not outrank newspapers and broadcast stations as sources of local news.  2008 Order 
¶ 57 (citing Media Ownership Study No. 1 (indicating that ―38.2 percent of all respondents 
consider broadcast television stations and 30.1 percent  consider local newspapers ‗the most 
important source of local news or local current affairs‘ whereas only 6.7 percent of all 
respondents say the same concerning the Internet‖)).  Similarly, the FCC was justified in 
treating broadcasters differently than cable operators (which face no cross-ownership 
restrictions but must comply with local ownership rules) because ―cable television is not 
nearly as significant a source of local news as the broadcast media,‖ and therefore ―mergers 
involving [those] systems do not pose a serious threat to viewpoint diversity.‖  FCC Br. 73 
(citing 2008 Order ¶ 58; Prometheus I, 373 F.3d at 405).   
 Next, CBS analogizes this rule to a cable/broadcast cross-ownership rule invalidated 
by the D.C. Circuit Court in Fox Television Stations, Inc., 280 F.3d 1027, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 
2002).  But the rule at issue in that case is distinguishable—here, the radio/broadcast rule 
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permits cross-ownership within limits; in Fox, cross-ownership was banned entirely.  Id. at 
1035.  It was the rule‘s ―across-the-board prohibition‖ that the Court found impossible to 
reconcile with the FCC‘s simultaneous finding that common ownership of two broadcast 
stations would not necessarily compromise diversity.  Id. at 1052.  Here there is no such 
conflict, and no complete ban.   
Further, CBS complains that the rule ―fails to meaningfully differentiate among 
markets‖ because the majority of markets have more than 20 voices.  CBS Br. 22.  We do not 
see the significance of this observation, as CBS ―never explains why applying the least strict . 
. . limitation would be unreasonable.‖  FCC Br. 74.   
Finally, CBS objects that the rule treats radio stations as though they are equivalent to 
television stations in certain respects (i.e., by allowing a substitution of one radio station for 
one television station in larger markets), while recognizing that radio stations have a lesser 
effect on diversity.  CBS Br. 28.  The FCC notes that this amounts to a challenge of the 
―eight outlet‖ ownership rule per market (see additional discussion in section V.B).  FCC Br. 
75.  It argues that the limit on total outlets was ―in keeping with its concern with the overall 
impact on the number of commonly-owned outlets within a local market.‖  Id.  The FCC also 
argues that it was reasonable to conclude that ―broadcasters should have the flexibility to 
purchase an additional radio station instead of a second television station, since the latter 
would form a combination that would be[,] if anything[,] less worrisome from the standpoint 
of diversity.‖  Id. (emphasis in original).  We agree.  As the Commission notes, it has ―wide 
discretion‖ when making policy judgments such as this.  Id. (citing AT&T Corp. v. FCC, 220 
F.3d 607, 627 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).   
V. LOCAL TELEVISION OWNERSHIP RULE 
A.  Retention of the Pre-2003 Rule 
In 2003, the FCC relaxed the local television ownership rule to allow an entity to own 
two television stations in markets with 17 or fewer stations and three in markets with 18 or 
more stations (but retained the prohibition on combinations that include the top four stations 
in the market).  In Prometheus I, we noted that these revised numerical limits on television 
station ownership assumed equal market shares among stations, which was unsupported by 
the record, and remanded for the Commission ―to support and harmonize its rationale.‖  373 
F.3d at 419-20.   
In its 2008 Order, the FCC decided to retain the pre-2003 local television ownership 
rule.  Under this rule,  
an entity may own two television stations in the same [DMA] if: 
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(1) the Grade B contours
30
 of the stations do not overlap; or (2) 
at least one of the stations in the combination is not ranked 
among the top four stations in terms of audience share, and at 
least eight independently owned and operating commercial or 
non-commercial full-power broadcast television stations would 
remain in the DMA after the combination.   
2008 Order ¶ 87 (emphasis in original). 
As the FCC acknowledges, this decision represents a reversal from its 2003 
determination that the rule was no longer necessary.  Citing the explosion of media outlets 
since 1999, several Deregulatory Petitioners challenge the rule as overly restrictive.  See, e.g., 
Sinclair Br. 28-29; CBS Br. 33-39.  Their arguments do not persuade us.   
First, in the 2008 Order the FCC found that ―eliminating the rule could harm 
competition among broadcast television stations in local markets.‖  2008 Order ¶ 101.  It did 
not ignore the ―explosion‖ of media outlets in the industry; it simply concluded that, despite 
these changes, the rule remained ―necessary in the public interest to protect competition for 
viewers and in local television advertising markets.‖  Id. at ¶ 87.   
Second, the FCC eliminated the rule in 2003 in part because it was ―premised on the 
notion that only local TV stations contribute to viewpoint diversity and [did] not account for 
the contributions of other media . . . .‖  2003 Order ¶ 133.  In 2008, the Commission clarified 
its rationale:  while it acknowledged that ―the local television ownership rule is no longer 
necessary to foster diversity because there are other outlets for diversity of viewpoint in local 
markets,‖ it concluded that the rule was still necessary to promote competition among 
broadcast television stations.  2008 Order ¶¶ 100, 101.  Therefore, to the extent that the FCC 
decided that the rule was no longer necessary in the public interest because it was not 
necessary to promote diversity of viewpoint, that is no longer its justification.  And, contrary 
to NAB‘s assertion that the FCC is conflating diversity and competition, the benefits of the 
latter are distinct—―[c]ompetition  . . . provides an incentive to television stations to invest in 
better programming and to provide programming that is preferred by viewers,‖ whereas the 
goal of diversity is to ensure that local media markets contain a variety of viewpoints.  Id. at 
¶ 97.  Moreover, that the rule may advance the dual goals of competition and viewpoint 
diversity does not mean that the FCC‘s rationale—premised on competition alone—is 
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 A ―Grade B station contour is the geographical representation of an area served by a 
specified television signal strength.‖  FCC Br. 22 n.6 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 73.683).  In other 
words, it is the radius within which the majority of people can receive the station‘s signal a 
majority of the time.  See 47 C.F.R. § 73.684. 
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unreasonable. 
CBS argues that the FCC acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to consider 
whether to allow triopolies (common ownership of three television stations) in large, diverse 
markets.  CBS Br. 31.  But, as the FCC points out, it is only obligated to give a rational 
reason for retaining existing limits as necessary in the public interest; it need not address 
other solutions to the same problem.  FCC Br. 79 (citing Ass’n of Public-Safety Commc’n 
Officials-Int’l, Inc. v. FCC (―APCO‖), 76 F.3d 395, 400 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (―[T]he fact that 
there are other solutions to a problem is irrelevant provided that the option selected is not 
irrational.‖) (quotations and citation omitted)).  We believe the FCC has offered rational 
reasons for retaining this rule. 
B.  Retention of the “Top Four/Eight Voices” Test 
As noted, the local television ownership rule specifies that an entity may own two 
television stations in a single market if (1) the signal contours do not overlap; or (2) at least 
one of the stations is not ranked among the top four and at least eight independently owned 
stations would remain operating in the market after the combination.  2008 Order ¶ 87.   
 Several Deregulatory Petitioners challenge this part of the rule.  Sinclair argues that 
the FCC fails to articulate why it has chosen eight voices as necessary to promote 
competition.  Sinclair Br. 34.  This is not true.  The FCC explained that it chose ―eight 
voices‖ to  
ensure that each market includes four stations affiliated with the 
four major networks in each market (i.e., ABC, NBC, CBS, and 
Fox), plus at least an equal number of independently owned-
and-operated broadcast television stations that are not affiliated 
with a major network. Preserving the independent ownership in 
each local market of four stations . . . will help to ensure that 
local television stations, spurred by competition, will provide 
dynamic and vibrant alternative fare, including local news and 
public affairs programming. . . . [T]he Commission . . . has 
found that there is generally a significant gap between the top 
four stations in a market and the remaining stations.  In light of 
this concentration among the top four stations in most markets, 
we believe that it is prudent to require the presence of at least 
four (rather than two) competitors not affiliated with a major 
network in order to ensure vibrant competition in the local 
television marketplace. 
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2008 Order ¶ 99.  This was clearly a line-drawing exercise (which is ―the agency‘s 
responsibility,‖ AT&T, 220 F.3d at 627), and the FCC has reasonably explained its decision 
to draw the line at eight voices.   
 Sinclair also argues that retaining this rule violates the D.C. Circuit Court‘s mandate 
in Sinclair Broadcast Group v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 2002).  In that case, the Court 
held that the FCC had ―failed to demonstrate that its exclusion of non-broadcast media from 
the eight voices exception is ‗necessary in the public interest‘ under § 202(h) of the 1996 
[Telecommunications] Act,‖ and rejected its diversity-of-viewpoint rationale.  Id. at 165.  
Here, the FCC has offered a new and reasonable rationale for this policy choice—
competition.  As it explained: 
The local television ownership rule counts only broadcast 
television stations as voices because the local television 
ownership rule is designed to preserve competition in the local 
television market.  The radio/television cross-ownership rule, by 
contrast, is designed to protect viewpoint diversity and thus 
takes into account a broader range of voices than does the local 
television rule.  Furthermore, we count more voices in the 
radio/television cross-ownership rule than in the 
newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rule because newspapers 
and television station combinations involve the two most 
important types of sources for news and information.   
2008 Order ¶ 80 n.259.  Contrary to NAB‘s claim, the FCC concluded that the rule does not 
depend on the effect of other video programming because the purpose of the rule is to 
promote competition among the stations themselves.  FCC Br. 82 (citing 2008 Order ¶ 101).   
 Finally, the FCC also provided rational explanations for preserving its ―top four‖ 
exception.  Sinclair and CBS argue that the record lacks evidence that mergers or joint 
operations of top four stations harm competition (and fail to account for marketplace 
realities), and thus that this portion of the rule is unsupportable.  Sinclair Br. 42-48; CBS Br. 
39-46.  But, consistent with its 2003 Order, the FCC found that ―combinations of top four 
stations should be prohibited because mergers of those stations would be the most deleterious 
to competition‖ that ―would often result in a single firm with a significantly larger market 
share than the others‖ and ―would reduce incentives to improve programming that appeals to 
mass audiences.‖  2008 Order ¶ 102.  It also found, as it did in its 2003 Order, that ―a 
significant ‗cushion‘ of audience share percentage points continues to separate the top four 
stations from the fifth-ranked stations.‖  Id.  We upheld the same determination in 
Prometheus I,  373 F.3d at 417-18 ( ―[W]e must uphold an agency‘s line-drawing decision 
when it is supported by the evidence in the record. . . . Here there is ample evidence in the 
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record to support the Commission‘s restriction on combinations among the top-four stations 
as opposed the top-three or some other number.‖).  We do so again here.     
C.  Declining to Tighten the Television “Duopoly Rule” 
Citizen Petitioners argue that the FCC‘s decision not to tighten the duopoly 
component of the local television rule, which allows entities to own two television stations in 
some markets under the circumstances described above, was arbitrary and capricious.  
Citizen Petitioners Br. 43-47.  They assert that the FCC failed to consider the effect of the 
transition to digital television, which allows stations to broadcast multiple streams of 
programming (―multicast‖) over a single channel (for example, a regular station and a high-
definition station for the same station affiliate in a DMA) and generate new revenue without 
the need to purchase multiple stations in a single market.  Id. at 45.   
In its 2008 Order, the FCC rejected calls to tighten the duopoly rule, stating that 
―owning a second in-market station can result in substantial savings in overhead and 
management costs,‖ and finding that ―these potential significant benefits of duopolies . . . in 
markets with a plethora of diverse voices, outweigh commenters‘ . . . claims that duopolies 
harm diversity and competition.‖  2008 Order ¶ 98.  In its brief and at oral argument, the 
FCC addressed Citizen Petitioners‘ concerns by contending that the digital transition was not 
completed until June 2009, and it was reasonable to ―move cautiously and not rely on an 
incomplete transition to a new technology as a basis for making the local television rule more 
restrictive.‖  FCC Br. 84.  It added that Citizen Petitioners are free to raise this issue in the 
2010 Quadrennial Review.  Id.   
While it may have been preferable for the FCC to address the implications of the 
digital transition in the 2008 Order itself, we do not believe that its failure to do so amounts 
to arbitrary and capricious action.  First, the digital transition was not complete at the time the 
2008 Order was issued, so it is not clear that the FCC ―entirely failed to consider an 
important aspect of the problem‖ as it existed during its 2006 Quadrennial Review.  State 
Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.  Second, the Commission based its decision to retain the rule on 
findings that the post-1999 rule has not been shown to harm competition among stations in 
local markets.  Thus, the FCC did not need to promulgate a more restrictive rule just because 
entities may gain similar economies of scale and generate new revenue by multicasting.  
Finally, as mentioned by the FCC, Citizen Petitioners are free to raise this issue in the 2010 
Quadrennial Review in light of the completed digital transition.
31
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 Citizen Petitioners also argue that the local television rule should be tightened because 
allowing duopolies has harmed minority and female ownership according to an FCC-
Commissioned study.  Citizen Petitioners Br. 49-50 (citing Allen S. Hammond, IV et al., The 
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VI.  LOCAL RADIO OWNERSHIP RULE 
In its 2008 Order, the FCC retained its local radio ownership rule.  2008 Order ¶ 110. 
 That rule allows an entity to ―own, operate, or control‖ from five to eight commercial radio 
stations, only three to five of which may be in the same service (AM/FM), depending on the 
number of full-power commercial and non-commercial stations in the market.  Id.  These 
limits were initially set by Congress as part of the 1996 Telecommunications Act and 
retained by the Commission in 2003.  FCC Br. 84-85 (citing 2003 Order ¶¶ 239, 294).  In 
Prometheus I, we upheld the FCC‘s use of a numerical limits approach ―‗to guard against 
consolidation . . . and to ensure a market structure that fosters opportunities for new entry 
into radio broadcasting.‘‖  373 F.3d at 431-32 (citing 2003 Order ¶ 291).   However, we 
remanded its decision to retain the existing numerical limits because the FCC‘s rationale that 
they ensure equal-sized competitors did not adequately explain the limits chosen.  Id. at 432-
34.   
In the 2008 Order, the FCC abandoned its justification from 2003.  2008 Order ¶ 117. 
Instead, it ―rest[ed its] decision on [the] conclusion that relaxing the rule to permit greater 
consolidation would be inconsistent with the Commission‘s public interest objectives of 
ensuring that the benefits of competition and diversity are realized in local radio markets,‖ 
while ―[m]aking the numerical limits more restrictive would be inconsistent with Congress‘ 
decision to relax the local radio ownership limits in the 1996 Telecommunications Act and 
would disserve the public interest by unduly disrupting the radio broadcasting industry.‖  Id.  
To support this balancing rationale, the FCC pointed to statistics that show significant 
consolidation in the radio broadcast industry and an increase in advertising rates after 1996,
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while recognizing that prior to 1996 ―the local radio ownership rules did not effectively 
recognize that a certain level of consolidation can be efficient‖ and any tightening of the 
rules would result in widespread divestitures, ―undermine settled expectations,‖ and ―thus be 
a significant shock to the market.‖  Id. at ¶¶ 119, 120.  Given these findings, and the guidance 
provided by Congress in the 1996 Telecommunications Act, the FCC has demonstrated that 
                                                                                                                                                  
Impact of the FCC’s TV Duopoly Rule Relaxation on Minority & Women Owned Broadcast 
Stations, 1999-2006 (June 2007) (―Media Ownership Study 8‖).  However, the study they 
cite was discounted by the FCC because a peer review concluded that it suffered from serious 
logical flaws.  FCC Br. 102 n.32 (referring to Congressional Research Service Report, The 
FCC’s 10 Commissioned Economic Research Studies on Media Ownership: Policy 
Implications 34 (Dec. 5, 2007) (―CRS Report‖) (noting, among other factors, the failure of 
Media Ownership Study 8 to control for elimination of a minority tax certificate program)).    
32
 For example, the number of commercial radio station owners declined 39% between 1996 
and 2007, and the largest commercial firm in each market has, on average, 46% of that 
market‘s total radio advertising revenue, while the top two have 74%.  Id. at ¶ 118.   
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the existing numerical limits are necessary in the public interest. 
Clear Channel contends that the FCC ignored record evidence and failed to support its 
decision with reasoned analysis.  Clear Channel Br. 17.  We disagree.  The Commission cited 
the very study Clear Channel claims it ignored (finding that consolidation has no effect on 
advertising prices), but it chose to credit another study in the record that reached the opposite 
conclusion (consolidation caused advertising prices to double).  FCC Br. 87.  Also, the FCC 
did not rely on an ―irrelevant consideration‖ when it noted an increase in radio consolidation 
at the national level (as opposed to within local markets), because record evidence shows 
(and the Commission cited) significant consolidation in local markets as well.  FCC Br. 87-
88 (citing 2008 Order ¶ 118).  Also contrary to Clear Channel‘s contentions, the FCC was 
not required to demonstrate that its rule was superior to that proposed by Clear Channel, but 
rather that its chosen rule was based on ―reasoned analysis supported by the evidence before 
the Commission.‖  APCO, 76 F.3d at 398.  
The FCC was also justified in retaining the AM/FM ―subcaps.‖  It adopted the 
subcaps to ―‗prevent one entity from putting together a powerful combination of stations in a 
single service that may enjoy an advantage over stations in a different service.‘‖  FCC Br. 89 
(quoting Revision of Radio Rules and Policies, 7 F.C.C.R. 2755, 2778, ¶ 44 (1992)).  In 
Prometheus I, we upheld the subcap on FM stations but ruled that the FCC had failed to 
explain adequately its decision to retain the subcap on AM ownership and requested it to do 
so on remand.  373 F.3d at 434-35.   
In the 2008 Order the FCC provided an adequate explanation.  Specifically, it 
recognized the ―significant technical and marketplace differences between AM and FM 
stations,‖ and found that eliminating the subcaps ―would be inconsistent with our interest in 
protecting competition in local radio markets.‖  2008 Order ¶ 134.  And, while the 
Commission acknowledged that ―in many cases, these differences between AM and FM 
stations militate solely in favor of FM ownership limits due to factors such as AM stations‘ 
lesser bandwidth, inferior audio signal, and smaller radio audiences,‖ it found that there was 
evidence supporting AM limits as well.  Id.  ―For example, . . . AM stations are ranked 
number one in 11 of the [top-50 markets], and . . . seven additional top-50 markets had AM 
stations rated among the top three stations.  Thus, in certain local markets with top-ranked 
AM stations,‖ the FCC found that ―the AM subcaps are necessary to prevent excessive 
market power from being concentrated in the hands of one station owner.‖  Id.  There were 
also comments in the record warning that ―‗large companies could bid up the price of AM 
stations and further erode th[e] abysmally low representation‘ of minority and female radio 
station owners.‖  Id. at ¶ 133 n.423 (citing 10/23/06 UCC Comments at 85).  Together these 
findings are adequate to justify maintaining the cap on AM ownership, as there was evidence 
in the record that AM stations are significant radio voices in many of the top markets, and 
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that their further consolidation could injure the public interest, including harm to the goal of 
promoting minority and female ownership.   
Finally, we disagree with Clear Channel‘s contention that the transition to digital radio 
will obviate any perceived differences between AM and FM stations, and therefore the need 
for subcaps.  First, digital radio is still in its early stages.  As the FCC points out, as of July 
2009 only 6% of AM radio stations were authorized to transmit digital signals.  FCC Br. 91 
n.27.  Also, its 2008 Order recognized that the digital transition may actually exacerbate the 
technical differences between AM and FM stations because ―FM stations have rights to more 
spectrum and are further along in their digital transition.‖  2008 Order ¶ 132 (citing 10/23/06 
UCC Comments at 84).  Although the digital transition may ultimately have a significant 
effect on the technological and economic advantages of FM stations, it has not yet done so.  
Thus, the FCC was justified in declining to rely on it in evaluating this rule.   
VII.    RETENTION OF THE DUAL NETWORK RULE 
In its 2008 Order, the FCC retained its dual network rule, which ―permits common 
ownership of multiple broadcast networks, but prohibits a merger between or among the ‗top 
four‘ networks.‖  2008 Order ¶ 139.  The FCC determined that the rule was still necessary in 
the public interest because the ―vertical integration of each of the top four networks,‖ and 
their operation as a ―strategic group in the national advertising market,‖ raise concerns that 
mergers would allow the merged firm to ―reduce its program purchases and/or the price it 
pays for programming.‖  Id. at ¶ 140.   The FCC reasoned that ―these competitive harms 
would reduce program output, choices, quality, and innovation to the detriment of viewers.‖  
Id.  It also concluded that such mergers would harm localism, because it would ―reduce the 
ability of affiliates to bargain with the network for favorable terms of affiliation, reducing 
affiliates‘ influence on network programming, and thereby diminishing the ability of the 
affiliates to serve their communities.‖  Id.   
This rule was not challenged in Prometheus I.  Very few parties filed comments 
advocating for a relaxation of the rule, and but two—Fox and CBS—suggested repeal.  Only 
CBS now challenges the rule before us by asserting that the FCC ―failed to identify the 
characteristics that make the four named networks unique‖ or ―why the networks‘ supposed 
‗uniqueness‘ should result in a regulatory disadvantage . . . .‖  CBS Br. 47.  We disagree.   
As outlined above, the FCC identified several unique features of the four networks—
including their vertical integration and operation as a strategic group.  See 2008 Order ¶ 139. 
In addition, it noted that the ―top four networks supply their affiliated local stations with 
programming intended to attract mass audiences and advertisers that want to reach such a 
large, nationwide audience.  By contrast, the emerging networks target more specialized, 
niche audiences similar to cable television networks.‖  Id. at ¶ 139 n.439.   
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We also disagree with CBS that the variety of broadcast and cable networks makes the 
rule unnecessary.  CBS Br. 49. As the FCC reasoned, ―the four largest broadcast networks 
serve a unique role in the electronic media and . . . no other networks, cable or broadcast, 
reach nearly as large an audience as they do.‖  Id. at ¶ 141  n.451.   Therefore, even though 
the FCC has elsewhere described today‘s media marketplace as ―dynamic‖ and 
―competitive,‖ it was not inconsistent to retain the dual network rule based in part on the 
harm to competition that would result from mergers of the top four networks.  See id.; CBS 
Br. 50; FCC Br. 96.  
VIII. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MEDIA OWNERSHIP RULES 
Deregulatory Petitioners argue that all of the FCC‘s media ownership rules are 
unconstitutional.  See Media General Br. 40-60; Cox Br. 39-49; CBS Br. 53-59; Tribune Br. 
32-33, 39-40, 47-50; NAA Br. 44; Clear Channel Br. 33-38; Sinclair Br. 49-52.  Primarily, as 
they did in Prometheus I, Deregulatory Petitioners ask us to overturn the ―scarcity‖ doctrine.  
That doctrine establishes that ―[i]In light of [their] physical scarcity, Government allocation 
and regulation of broadcast frequencies are essential . . . .‖  NCCB, 436 U.S. at 799.  We 
continue to ―decline [Deregulatory Petitioners‘] invitation to disregard precedent.‖  
Prometheus I, 373 F.3d at 401.  ―The abundance of non-broadcast media does not render the 
broadcast spectrum any less scarce.‖  Id. at 402.  The Supreme Court‘s justification for the 
scarcity doctrine remains as true today as it was in 2004—indeed, in 1975— ―many more 
people would like to access the [broadcast spectrum] than can be accommodated.‖  Id. (citing 
NCCB, 436 U.S. at 799).   
We agree with the FCC that the rules do not violate the First Amendment because they 
are rationally related to substantial government interests in promoting competition and 
protecting viewpoint diversity.  FCC Br. 97 (citing NCCB, 436 U.S. at 799-800 (upholding 
substantial government interests in promoting diversified mass communications and 
viewpoint diversity)).  In NCCB, the Court said that limiting common ownership was a 
reasonable means of promoting these interests.  NCCB, 436 U.S. at 796.  Therefore, as we 
did in Prometheus I, we hold that the ―Commission‘s continued regulation of the common 
ownership of newspapers and broadcasters does not violate the First Amendment rights of 
either.‖  373 F.3d at 402. 
There is no basis for CBS and Clear Channel‘s First Amendment claims that the 
media ownership rules are impermissible attempts by the FCC to manipulate content.   CBS 
Br. 55-56; Clear Channel Br. 36-37.  These rules apply regardless of the content of 
programming.  We also disagree with Sinclair‘s assertion that the local television ownership 
rule violates the First Amendment because it ―singles out television stations.‖  Sinclair Br. 
49.  The D.C. Circuit Court rejected this argument in Sinclair, as do we for the same reasons. 
 284 F.3d at 168. 
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Although we remand the NBCO rule on other grounds, we deem lacking in merit 
Media General and Cox‘s argument that the rule violates their rights to equal protection 
under the Fifth Amendment by treating newspapers differently from other media.  Media 
General Br. 56-60; Cox Br. 46-49.  The Supreme Court has upheld this treatment, as we 
recognized in Prometheus I, and we are bound by that precedent.  373 F.3d at 401 (citing 
NCCB, 436 U.S. at 801-02 (upholding the constitutionality of the 1975 newspaper/broadcast 
cross-ownership ban)).  Similarly, it was not unconstitutional for the FCC to decline to 
regulate ownership of non-broadcast media; we still ―cannot [assume] that these media 
outlets contribute significantly to viewpoint diversity as sources of local news and 
information.‖  Id. (emphasis in original).  In any event, ―it is the Supreme Court‘s prerogative 
to change its own precedent.‖  Id. (citations omitted).   
IX. THE DIVERSITY ORDER AND THE ISSUE OF MINORITY AND WOMEN BROADCAST 
OWNERSHIP 
A.  Prometheus I Remand on Minority and Women Ownership Issues  
In Prometheus I we remanded two of the Commission‘s decisions dealing with 
broadcast ownership by minorities and women, and issued a caution regarding a third.  First, 
we held that the 2003 Order had arbitrarily repealed the Commission‘s only rule—the failed 
station solicitation rule (―FSSR‖)—directed at enhancing minority ownership, while also 
failing to consider the effects of its other rules on minority and female ownership more 
broadly.  The FCC adopted the FSSR during its review of its local television duopoly rule 
―[t]o alleviate concerns that its decision to allow duopolies would undermine television 
station ownership by minorities.‖  Prometheus I, 373 F.3d at 420.  The FSSR required 
applicants seeking waivers of the local television rule‘s requirements ―to provide notice of 
the sale to potential out-of-market buyers before it could sell the failed, failing, or unbuilt 
television station to an in-market buyer.‖  Id.  We concluded that the FCC‘s repeal of the 
FSSR in its 2003 Order was arbitrary and capricious under the APA: 
By failing to mention anything about the effect [the repeal of the 
FSSR] would have on potential minority station owners, the 
Commission has not provided ―a reasoned analysis indicating 
that prior policies and standards are being deliberately changed, 
not casually ignored.‖  Greater Boston TV Corp. v. FCC, 444 
F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970).  Furthermore, while the 
Commission had promised in 1999 to ―expand opportunities for 
minorities and women to enter the broadcast industry,‖ . . . the 
FSSR remained its only policy specifically aimed at fostering 
minority television station ownership.  In repealing the FSSR 
without any discussion of the effect of its decision on minority 
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television station ownership (and without ever acknowledging 
the decline in minority station ownership notwithstanding the 
FSSR), the Commission ―entirely failed to consider an important 
aspect of the problem,‖ and this amounts to arbitrary and 
capricious rulemaking.  State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43. . . .  For 
correction of this omission, we remand. 
Id. at 420-21 (internal footnotes and parallel citations omitted).  We noted that ―[r]epealing 
[the Commission‘s] only regulatory provision that promoted minority television station 
ownership without considering the repeal‘s effect on minority ownership is also inconsistent 
with the Commission‘s obligation to make the broadcast spectrum available to all people 
‗without discrimination on the basis of race.‘‖  Id. at 421, n.58 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 151).  
Second, we concluded that the FCC failed to consider proposals to promote minority 
broadcast ownership that the MMTC had submitted during the 2002 Biennial Review (the 
―MMTC Proposals‖).  The 2003 Order had proposed a separate proceeding to address 
proposals for advancing minority and disadvantaged businesses and promoting diversity in 
broadcasting.  See 2003 Order ¶¶ 49-50 (promising to issue a Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking to address the MMTC‘s 13 specific proposals).  We remanded the Commission‘s 
decision to defer consideration of these proposals and stated that it should address them at the 
same time that it addressed its ownership rules remanded from the 2003 Order.  Prometheus 
I, 373 F.3d at 421, n.59.   
Finally, we declined to accept Citizen Petitioners‘ concerns regarding the FCC‘s new 
transfer rule that prohibited ―the transfer or sale of grandfathered [radio/television] 
combinations that violate its local ownership limits except to certain ‗eligible entities‘ that 
qualify as small businesses.‖  Id. at 427.  In upholding the transfer rule, we rejected as 
premature ―Citizen Petitioners‘ contention that the Commission should have chosen ‗socially 
and economically disadvantaged businesses‘ (SDBs) as the waiver-eligible class instead of 
Small Business Administration-defined small businesses.‖  Id. at 428, n.70.  We reached that 
conclusion because the FCC had ―noted that, because of pending legislation, the definition of 
SDBs is currently too uncertain to be the basis of its regulation.‖  Id.  However, we noted that 
we expected a long-awaited SDB definition to be forthcoming: 
We anticipate, however, that by the next [2006] quadrennial 
review the Commission will have the benefit of a stable 
definition of SDBs, as well as several years of implementation 
experience, to help it reevaluate whether an SDB-based waiver 
will better promote the Commission‘s diversity objectives 
[compared to the revenue-based definition of eligible entities 
being used]. 
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Id. at 428, n.70. 
B.  Rulemaking Process regarding Minority and Female Ownership Issues   
during the 2006 Quadrennial Review 
1. The FNPR in 2006 and Second FNPR in 2007 
As discussed above, the Commission issued its FNPR in 2006, approximately two 
years after our remand in Prometheus I.  The two Commissioners who dissented in part from 
the order adopting the FNPR lamented its failure to discuss proposals to foster minority and 
female ownership.
33
  Shortly thereafter, in August 2006, the Diversity and Competition 
Supporters (―DCS‖) filed a motion for withdrawal of the 2006 FNPR and issuance of a 
revised FNPR.  See DCS, Motion for Withdrawal of the Further Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking and for the Issuance of a Revised Further Notice (Aug. 23, 2006) (the ―DCS 
Motion‖).  The DCS Motion argued that, among other failings, the FNPR lacked discussion 
of the MMTC Proposals and the SDB definition that our Prometheus I decision stated the 
Commission should consider during the course of its next rulemaking.  
One year later, the FCC issued a Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
(―Second FNPR‖) focused on minority and female ownership issues.  2006 Quadrennial 
Regulatory Review—Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other 
Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Second 
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 22 F.C.C.R. 14215, 2007 WL 2212878 (Aug. 1, 
2007).  The Second FNPR acknowledged the DCS Motion and agreed to ―set forth in greater 
detail‖ the MMTC Proposals.  Id. at ¶ 2.34  It also recognized the DCS‘s argument that ―the 
concept of SDBs is central to most of the minority ownership initiatives proposed in the 2002 
biennial review proceeding,‖ and ―without a definition for SDBs, the Commission cannot 
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 Commissioner Copps remarked that ―if all we can do is ask a few pat questions and then 
sweep this issue under the rug one more time, we are not laying the groundwork for 
progress.‖  Copps, Concurring in Part, Dissenting in Part, 21 F.C.C.R. at 8864.  He noted 
that the FNPR would set the Commission on track to repeat the omissions that caused us to 
remand these same proposals in 2004:  ―[T]his item fails to commit to specific efforts to 
advance ownership by minorities.  The Third Circuit‖ had remanded the Commission‘s 
earlier decision ―sidelining proposals to advance minority ownership.  Despite this, all we 
can muster up here are a few questions about this glaring challenge.‖  Id.  
34
 Specifically, it invited comment on (1) the MMTC Proposals submitted for consideration 
in the 2002 biennial review proceeding; (2) the MMTC Proposals listed in the 2003 Order 
that we instructed the Commission to address on remand; and (3) ―media-related 
recommendations of the [FCC‘s advisory] Diversity Committee.‖  Id. at ¶ 10. 
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effectively evaluate the existing small business cluster transfer policy or its other proposals, 
as remanded by the Prometheus court.‖  Id. at ¶ 7.  Further, the Second FNPR noted the 
contention that ―the SDB definition has already been fully briefed in the Commission‘s 
proceeding examining market entry barriers,‖ in which public comment was solicited ―on 
constitutionally permissible ways to further the [Commission‘s ownership-diversity related] 
mandates . . . .‖  Id. at ¶ 8 (citing § 257 of the 1996 Telecommunications Act and 47 U.S.C. 
§309(j)(3)(b)).  However, it did not provide descriptions of any existing proposals for SDB 
definitions (as it did for the MMTC Proposals) or discuss the Commission‘s analysis of 
existing briefing on those proposals‘ constitutionality or efficacy.  Instead, it merely called 
for general ―comment on MMTC‘s proposal that the Commission define SDBs for purposes 
of analyzing policy initiatives in support of media ownership diversity.‖  Id. at ¶ 9.35   
Finally, the Second FNPR sought comment on ―the extent to which the FSSR or 
another construction of the rule could promote minority and female ownership;‖ on how 
proposals regarding minority and female ownership ―would satisfy constitutional standards‖ 
in light of the Supreme Court‘s ruling in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 
(1995);
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 and on ―the Commission‘s statutory authority to address issues of minority and 
female ownership.‖  Second FNPR ¶¶ 12, 13, 14. 
Several of the FCC-commissioned economic research studies on media ownership, 
discussed above in regard to notice of the NBCO rule, attempted to address minority and 
female ownership issues.  However, as the Congressional Research Service (―CRS‖) 
concluded, ―all the researchers (and the peer reviewers) agree that the FCC‘s databases on 
minority and female ownership are inaccurate and incomplete and their use for policy 
analysis would be fraught with risk.‖  CRS Report at 54.  The CRS Report noted that the 
FCC would have difficulty complying with our remand with its existing data.  ―In its 
Prometheus decision, the Third Circuit instructed the FCC to consider the impact of changes 
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 The Second FNPR again asked ―that commenters address whether use of a proposed 
definition raises any constitutional concerns, practical concerns, or other considerations . . . .‖ 
 Id.  It also consolidated the docket from an earlier proceeding in which this issue had been 
briefed ―with our review of the media ownership rules‖ in order ―[t]o ensure full 
consideration of this issue.‖  Id. 
36
 The Commission noted that ―Adarand requires that governmental classifications based on 
race must be analyzed under strict scrutiny,‖ and that the Adarand standard ―was reaffirmed 
in the Supreme Court‘s decision upholding student body diversity in the context of higher 
education.‖  Second FNPR ¶¶ 13 (citing Adarand, 515 U.S. 200; Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306 (2003); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 
(2007)).      
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in its media ownership rules on minority ownership.  Without accurate data on minority (and 
female) ownership, it is impossible to perform such analysis.‖  Id. at 55.37 
C. The Diversity Order and Third FNPR in 2008 
The Commission‘s 2008 Order reinstated the FSSR as a component of the local 
television rule.  2008 Order ¶¶ 105, 109 (reinstating the rule and granting petitions for 
―reconsideration of our decision to eliminate the [FSSR]‖).  Separately, the FCC adopted the 
Diversity Order.  That Order adopted 13 proposals submitted during the rulemaking 
proceeding, with modifications, and rejected 10 other proposals.  See Diversity Order ¶¶ 10-
79.  It also sought comment on nine additional proposals in the attached Third FNPR.  Id. at 
¶¶ 80-101.  The majority of the adopted proposals use the same ―eligible entity‖ definition we 
anticipated would change in Prometheus I.   The Commission did not consider proposed SDB 
definitions, but sought further comment on ―whether we can or should expand‖ the eligible 
entity definition.  Id. at ¶ 80.  
Most of the proposals adopted in the Diversity Order are designed to expand 
opportunities for ―eligible entities,‖ as defined by the SBA standards for industry groupings 
based on revenue.
38
  Others include a ―zero tolerance‖ policy for ownership fraud and a ban 
on discrimination in broadcast transactions, the latter of which requires broadcasters to 
certify that they did not discriminate when selling a station.  In other words, the proposals 
that the FCC adopted are either targeted at small businesses as such, or reinforce existing 
prohibitions against discrimination.  
The Commission rejected 10 sets of proposals advocated by DCS and Rainbow/Push 
Coalition.  Id. at ¶¶ 65-79.  It did not address proposals offering race- and gender-neutral 
means to increase opportunities for minority and female ownership put forward by UCC and 
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 It also noted that ―[t]he same problem arises with respect to the impact of each and every 
media ownership rule on minority and female ownership,‖ which makes all of the FCC‘s 
media ownership rules vulnerable to being overturned ―until the Commission has developed 
a minority ownership database of sufficient accuracy to allow for reliable testing of the 
impact of the rules on minority ownership.‖  Id. (internal footnotes omitted). 
38
 According to the Diversity Order, the SBA ―defines as a small business a television 
broadcasting station that has no more than $13 million in annual receipts and a radio 
broadcasting entity that has no more than $6.5 million in annual receipts.‖  Id. at ¶ 6.  The 
SBA also considers revenue of parent companies, and eligible entities must satisfy ―several 
control tests‖ to ―ensure that ultimate control rests in an eligible entity that satisfies the 
revenue criteria.‖  Id.  
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Free Press.
39
  It also did not consider multiple proposals before it that urged use of non-
revenue based definitions of eligible entities, such as SDBs.  The Commission offered a 
constitutional avoidance rationale to justify limiting its consideration of eligible entity 
definitions, essentially arguing that it was sensible to avoid ―constitutional difficulties that 
might create impediments to the timely implementation‖ of its new rules, even though the 
constitutional issue had already been the subject of two rounds of notice and comment.  Id. at 
¶ 9.  Instead, as noted, the attached Third FNPR sought comment once again regarding these 
proposals.  Id. (seeking ―comment on whether [the FCC] should adopt an alternative 
definition of ‗eligible entity‘ that would specifically identify [minorities and women]‖). 
Commissioners Copps and Adelstein both concurred in part and dissented in part from 
the Diversity Order.  Their dissents emphasized: (1) the poor and worsening state of minority 
and female ownership, Copps, Diversity Order Dissent in Part, 23 F.C.C.R at 5982 (―Racial 
and ethnic minorities make up 33 percent of our population.  They own a scant 3 percent of 
all full-power commercial TV stations.  And that number is plummeting.‖);  (2) the 
Commission‘s lack of data and failure to make efforts to collect the data required for 
informed policy-making in this area, id. at 5983 (―We should have started by getting an 
accurate count of minority and female ownership—the one that the Congressional Research 
Service and the Government Accountability Office both just found that we didn‘t have. . . . 
[W]e don‘t even know how many minority and female owners there are . . . .‖); (3) the 
Commission‘s slowness regarding the issue of diversifying broadcast ownership despite its 
statutory mandate to do so, Adelstein, Diversity Order Dissent in Part, 23 F.C.C.R at 5986; 
(4) its failure to consider proposals that address minority and female ownership directly (such 
as those using non-revenue based definitions of eligible entities), id. at 5986-88; (5) the 
unsupported ―eligible entity‖ definition adopted, id. at 5987; and (6) the Commission‘s 
failure to consider the potential harms the Diversity Order might have on the groups it 
purports to help, id.   
D. The Eligible Entity Definition is Arbitrary and Capricious  
At a minimum, in adopting or modifying its rules the FCC must ―examine the relevant 
data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action[,] including a ‗rational connection 
between the facts found and the choice made.‘‖  State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (internal 
quotation omitted).  Citizen Petitioners assert that the Diversity Order does not analyze the 
adopted proposals‘ effectiveness and presents no reliable data supporting the eligible entity 
definition chosen to achieve the stated goal of the rulemaking exercise—increasing broadcast 
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 These largely called for tightening and enforcing media ownership limits, instead of 
relaxing them or retaining existing limits, to increase ownership opportunities for minorities 
and women. 
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ownership by minorities and women.  Citizen Petitioners Br. 53.  We agree that the 
Commission has not demonstrated that the eligible entity definition in the Diversity Order is 
based on ―reasoned analysis supported by the evidence before the Commission.‖  APCO, 76 
F.3d at 398.  
First and foremost, the Diversity Order does not explain how the eligible entity 
definition adopted would increase broadcast ownership by minorities and women.  In the two 
paragraphs that discuss the definition adopted, the Commission refers only to ―small 
businesses,‖ and occasionally ―new entrants,‖ as expected beneficiaries.  Diversity Order ¶¶ 
6-7.  The remaining two paragraphs of the FCC‘s discussion (1) challenge the contention that 
ownership by minorities and women might be diminished by the chosen eligible entity 
definition,
40
 and (2) seek comment on taking action that would ―increase the ownership of 
broadcast stations by minorities and women specifically.‖  Id. at ¶¶ 8-9.  Nowhere in its 
discussion does the FCC support its conclusion that this definition ―will be effective in 
creating new opportunities for broadcast ownership by . . . women and minorities.‖  Id. at ¶ 9. 
  
Second, it is hard to understand how measures using this definition would achieve the 
stated goal.  For example, by the Commission‘s own calculations, minorities comprise 8.5% 
of commercial radio station owners that qualify as small businesses, but 7.78% of the 
commercial radio industry as a whole—a difference of less than 1%.  See id. at ¶ 8.  Thus, 
these measures cannot be expected to have much effect on minority ownership.   
Third, the Commission referenced no data on television ownership by minorities or 
women and no data regarding commercial radio ownership by women.  This is because, as 
the Commission has since conceded, it has no accurate data to cite.  In May 2009, it 
published a Report and Order and Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking addressing 
this issue.  See Promoting Diversification of Ownership in the Broadcasting Services, 2006 
Quadrennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules 
and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
Report and Order and Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 24 F.C.C.R. 5896, 
2009 WL 1229684 (May 5, 2009) (―Fourth FNPR‖).  It states: 
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 In those two paragraphs, the Commission ―disagree[d] . . . that adoption of this small 
business classification ‗would actually be regressive and serve to diminish minority 
ownership.‘‖  Id. at ¶ 8 (emphasis in original).  It took issue with Free Press‘s data that 
―purport to show that minority owned commercial radio stations are less well represented 
among SBA-defined small businesses (5.88 percent) than they are in the industry as a whole 
(7.78 percent).‖  Id.  It argued that the correct interpretation of that data indicates that ―at 
least 8.5 percent, not 5.88 percent, of commercial radio stations owned by SBA-defined small 
businesses are minority owned.‖  Id. 
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The Commission has long sought to promote broadcast station 
ownership by minorities and women in order to foster diversity 
in broadcasting.  Although some of the Commission‘s 
initiatives—such as the now-repealed minority tax certificate 
program—have had beneficial effects, the overall level of 
minority and female ownership in the broadcast industry 
remains dismal.  Unfortunately, the Commission currently does 
not possess reliable data on the precise status of minority and 
female ownership—data that we will need to establish and 
maintain effective policies over time . . . . 
Fourth FNPR ¶ 1 (internal footnotes omitted) (emphasis added); see also id. at ¶ 12 (―We 
agree with commenters, study authors, and the [General Accounting Office] that the data we 
have collected in the past . . . are not sufficiently reliable and comprehensive to form the 
basis for effectively assessing ownership diversity and whether additional measures to 
promote it are necessary.‖).  The ―Order‖ portion of the Fourth FNPR sets in motion a 
process for collecting better data as a basis for informed policy-making.  ―[W]e believe that 
the changes we are adopting today,‖ it states, ―adequately address commenters‘ and the 
[General Accounting Office‘s] criticisms and will allow us to undertake studies that reliably 
analyze minority and female ownership.‖  Id. at ¶ 12.  While this is certainly a welcome and 
long overdue step, it does not remedy the existing data gap in the Diversity Order.  We 
anticipate that it will, however, lay necessary groundwork for the Commission‘s actions on 
remand.  
In sum, the eligible entity definition adopted in the Diversity Order lacks a sufficient 
analytical connection to the primary issue that Order intended to address.  The Commission 
has offered no data attempting to show a connection between the definition chosen and the 
goal of the measures adopted—increasing ownership of minorities and women.  As such, the 
eligible entity definition adopted is arbitrary and capricious, and we remand those portions of 
the Diversity Order that rely on it.
41
  We conclude once more that the FCC did not provide a 
sufficiently reasoned basis for deferring consideration of the proposed SDB definitions and 
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 We uphold those measures in the Diversity Order that do not rely on the unsupported 
eligible entity definition.  As numbered in the Diversity Order, these are the (4) Ban on 
Discrimination in Broadcast Transactions; (5) ―Zero Tolerance‖ Policy for Ownership Fraud; 
(6) Non-Discrimination Provisions in Advertising Sales Contracts; (7) Longitudinal Research 
on Minority and Women Ownership Trends; (8) Local and Regional Bank Participation in 
SBA Guaranteed Loan Programs; (12) ―Access to Capital‖ Conference; and (13) Guidebook 
on Diversity. 
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remand for it to do so before it completes its 2010 Quadrennial Review.
42
  
Despite our prior remand requiring the Commission to consider the effect of its rules 
on minority and female ownership, and anticipating a workable SDB definition well before 
this rulemaking was completed, the Commission has in large part punted yet again on this 
important issue.  While the measures adopted that take a strong stance against discrimination 
are no doubt positive, the Commission has not shown that they will enhance significantly 
minority and female ownership, which was a stated goal of this rulemaking proceeding.  This 
is troubling, as the Commission relied on the Diversity Order to justify side-stepping, for the 
most part, that goal in its 2008 Order.
43
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  Stating that the task is difficult in light of Adarand does not constitute ―considering‖ 
proposals using an SDB definition.  The FCC‘s own failure to collect or analyze data, and lay 
other necessary groundwork, may help to explain, but does not excuse, its failure to consider 
the proposals presented over many years.  If the Commission requires more and better data to 
complete the necessary Adarand studies, it must get the data and conduct up-to-date studies, 
as it began to do in 2000 before largely abandoning the endeavor.  We are encouraged that 
the FCC has taken steps in this direction and we anticipate that it will act with diligence to 
synthesize and release existing data such that studies will be available for public review in 
time for the completion of the 2010 Quadrennial Review.   
In addition, we note that the Supreme Court has upheld targeted FCC efforts to 
promote increased minority ownership.  The Court has ruled that ―the interest in enhancing 
broadcast diversity is, at the very least, an important governmental objective‖ that justified 
FCC policies designed to promote minority ownership in broadcasting.  Metro Broadcasting 
Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 567 (1990), overruled on other grounds in Adarand, 515 U.S. 200 
(overruling use of intermediate scrutiny).  The Court upheld such policies because ―the 
conclusion that there is a nexus between minority ownership and broadcasting diversity . . . is 
corroborated by a host of empirical evidence,‖ id. at 580, and ―both Congress and the 
Commission have concluded that the minority ownership programs are critical means of 
promoting broadcast diversity.‖  Id. at 579.  
 
43
 The primary instance in which minority ownership was mentioned in the 2008 Order was 
in the Commission‘s reinstatement of the FSSR as a component of the local television rule.  
2008 Order ¶ 105 (―To ensure that we do not negatively impact minority owners, we now 
reinstate [the FSSR] in the waiver standard.‖).  In addition, in rejecting comments arguing 
that the FCC‘s presumption allowing mergers in the top 20 DMAs in its new NBCO rule 
would further diminish minority ownership (because those stations would become acquisition 
targets), the Commission argued that ―although we believe that it is appropriate to adopt 
measures to encourage minority ownership, as we do in the Diversity Order that we adopt 
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Promoting broadcast ownership by minorities and women is, in the FCC‘s own words, 
―a long-standing policy goal of the Commission, and is consistent with [the Commission‘s] 
mandate under [§] 309(j) of the Act.‖  Fourth FNPR ¶ 12.  We recognize that there are 
significant challenges involved in meeting this important policy goal that is shared by 
Congress, the Commission, and the myriad interested parties who have participated in 
rulemaking proceedings toward this end.  However, the Commission appears yet to have 
gathered the information required to address these challenges, which it needs to do in the 
course of its review already underway.  As ownership diversity is an important aspect of the 
overall media ownership regulatory framework, see Prometheus I, 373 F.3d at 420-21, we re-
emphasize that the actions required on remand should be completed within the course of the 
Commission‘s 2010 Quadrennial Review of its media ownership rules. 
X. CONCLUSION 
We vacate and remand the NBCO rule for the Commission to provide adequate notice 
and an opportunity to comment in the context of its 2010 Quadrennial Review.  We affirm 
the other rules in the 2008 Order.  We also vacate and remand those provisions of the 
Diversity Order that rely on the existing eligible entity definition, and the FCC‘s decision to 
defer consideration of proposed SDB definitions, so that it may justify or modify its approach 
to advancing broadcast ownership by minorities and women during its 2010 Quadrennial 
Review.  This panel retains jurisdiction over the remanded issues. 
                                                                                                                                                  
today, we do not think it is appropriate to deny minority owners the opportunity to sell their 
stations . . . .‖  Id. at ¶ 61 n.202.  In justifying retaining its AM/FM subcaps, the FCC noted 
that it received comments arguing that the subcaps prohibited expansion of ethnic and 
foreign language programming, but others arguing that they ―serve[] the public interest by 
promoting new entry . . . particularly by small businesses, women, minorities, and 
entrepreneurs. . . .  New entry promotes outlet diversity, which in turn enhances diversity and 
the public interest.‖  Id. at ¶ 133.  It also noted comments in the record warning that ―large 
companies could bid up the price of AM stations and further erode th[e] abysmally low 
representation‘ of minority and female radio stations owners.‖  Id. at ¶ 133 n.423.  Finally, it 
briefly referenced comments in the record regarding the effect of consolidation of local radio 
ownership on minority owners.  Id. at ¶ 128 n.403.   
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Prometheus Radio Project v. Federal Communications Commission, No. 08-3078, etc. 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in part. 
 The decision to vacate and remand the 2008 newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership 
rule (“NBCO rule”) preserves an outdated and twice-abandoned ban,1 adopted in 1975, 
on common ownership of a broadcast station and a daily newspaper in the same market.  
Because I believe the Federal Communications Commission provided adequate notice 
and opportunity to comment on the 2008 NBCO rule, I respectfully dissent from the 
Court’s holding that the FCC failed to satisfy the Administrative Procedure Act’s 
requirements.  Moreover, because I believe potential objections to a new NBCO rule or 
new Diversity Order need not be reviewed by this panel, I also dissent from the decision 
to retain jurisdiction over parts of the ongoing 2010 Quadrennial Review.  I would affirm 
the 2006 Quadrennial Regulatory Review, 23 FCC Rcd. 2010 (2008) (“2008 Order”), in 
its entirety, permit the 2008 NBCO rule to go into effect, and allow the 2010 Quadrennial 
Review to run its course.  
In July 2006, the FCC issued a Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“2006 
FNPR”) stating the FCC was reconsidering the NBCO rule and seeking comment on 
cross-ownership limits.  See Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 21 FCC Rcd. 8834 
(2006).  The 2006 FNPR asked:  “Should limits vary depending upon the characteristics 
of local markets?  If so, what characteristics should be considered, and how should they 
be factored into any limits?”  Id. at 8848, ¶ 32.  If this were the first notice in which these 
issues were raised, more detail would likely have been required.  But the context in which 
these questions were asked was clear: The FCC announced it was reconsidering its cross-
ownership rules not only in the normal course of its own periodic review, but also in 
response to our remand, see Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC (Prometheus I), 373 F.3d 
372 (3d Cir. 2004), of the FCC’s cross-media limits promulgated following the 2002 
Biennial Regulatory Review.  See 2006 FNPR, 21 FCC Rcd. at 8848, ¶ 32 (“We invite 
comment on all of the issues remanded by the Prometheus court regarding cross-
ownership. . . .  To the extent that we will not use the [Diversity Index] to justify changes 
to the existing cross-ownership rules, we seek comment on how we should approach 
cross-ownership limits.”); see also 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, 18 FCC Rcd. 
13620 (2003) (“2003 Order).  Accordingly, and as is well known to the parties involved, 
the NBCO rule is not just the product of one isolated rulemaking, but is instead the 
outcome of an iterative and interactive process of statutorily prescribed agency review of 
broadcast media regulation and our judicial review of that agency action.   
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 The FCC first declined to retain the ban in its 2003 Order, then again in its 2008 Order. 
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In Prometheus I, we remanded the cross-media limits promulgated in the 2003 
Order.  The FCC had previously initiated proceedings on the NBCO rule reviewed in 
Prometheus I by issuing a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“2001 NPRM”).  See Cross-
Ownership of Broadcast Stations and Newspapers; Newspaper/Radio Cross-Ownership 
Waiver Policy, 16 FCC Rcd. 17283 (2001).  It sought comment on the possibility of 
taking a case-by-case approach to determine whether a proposed cross-ownership 
combination would be in the public interest.  See 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, 17 
FCC Rcd. 18503, 18506, ¶ 7, 18538-39, ¶¶ 106-11 (2002).  Although in the 2003 Order 
the FCC concluded “that, on balance, the benefits of precision that case-by-case review 
of every transaction would provide were outweighed by the benefits of bright-line rules,” 
2008 Order, 23 FCC Rcd. at 2041, ¶ 54 (citing 2003 Order, 18 FCC Rcd. at 13645, ¶ 82), 
on remand the FCC “[e]stablish[ed] presumptions, as opposed to a bright line [rule,] 
allow[ing] for the evaluation of proposed newspaper/broadcast combinations under 
defined circumstances on a case-by-case basis,” id. at 2039-40, ¶ 52. 
The presumptions adopted in the 2008 Order were, in substantial part, proposed in 
the 2001 NPRM.  The 2001 NPRM proposed an NBCO rule that would allow a 
newspaper/broadcast combination in circumstances in which the radio or television 
station was not among the top four ranked stations in the market and at least eight media 
voices would remain.  The 2001 NPRM stated: 
Another option for modifying the newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership 
policies would be to combine the “market concentration” and “voice count” 
standards.  Under this approach, a combination would be permitted so long 
as both parties do not have a certain market share (combined or individual), 
and so long as a minimum number of voices would remain in the market 
post-merger.  This approach would be consistent with the recently revised 
TV duopoly rule, which permits common ownership of two TV stations 
within the same [Designated Market Area (“DMA”)] if both are not ranked 
among the top four in the market, and at least eight independently owned 
TV stations would remain in the DMA post-merger. 
2001 NPRM, 16 FCC Rcd. at 17300, ¶ 46.  Moreover, the 2001 NPRM also discussed 
whether the FCC should presume it is in the public interest in certain circumstances to 
waive any ban on newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership, “such that combinations would 
be permitted if one of the parties to the combination has failed, is failing, or if the 
combination would result in new service.”  Id. at 17301, ¶ 49. 
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Following our decision in Prometheus I remanding the cross-media limits in the 
2003 Order, the FCC established presumptions similar to those proposed in the 2001 
NPRM.  The FCC concluded: 
[A] waiver of the cross-ownership ban is in the public interest in the 
following circumstances:  when a daily newspaper seeks to combine with a 
radio station in a top 20 DMA, or when a daily newspaper seeks to combine 
with a television station in a top 20 DMA and (1) the television station is 
not among the top four ranked stations in the market and (2) at least eight 
“major media voices” would remain in the DMA. 
2008 Order, 23 FCC Rcd. at 2022-23, ¶ 20.  Moreover, for DMAs outside of the top 20, 
the FCC presumes that a newspaper/broadcast combination is not in the public interest 
unless: (1) the newspaper or broadcast station is “failed” or “failing” or (2) the proposed 
combination results in a new source of a significant amount of local news programming.  
Id. at 2047-49, ¶¶ 65-67. 
On the facts of this case, it is difficult to believe that Citizen Petitioners, who 
participated in all prior proceedings, were not fairly apprised of either “the terms or 
substance of the proposed rule” or “a description of the subjects and issues involved” as 
required by the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).  5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3); see NVE, 
Inc. v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 436 F.3d 182, 191 (3d Cir. 2006).  Citizen 
Petitioners were given “fair notice,” Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 
158, 174 (2007), of all significant subjects and issues involved, see Fertilizer Inst. v. 
Browner, 163 F.3d 774, 779 (3d Cir. 1998).  The 2006 FNPR made clear that, on remand 
from Prometheus I, the FCC was planning a significant revision of the NBCO rule 
noticed by the 2001 NPRM and appearing in the 2003 Order, and was again considering 
tailoring cross-ownership limits to local markets.  See 2006 FNPR, 21 FCC Rcd. at 8848, 
¶ 32.  Because the general framework of the 2008 NBCO rule was actually proposed in 
the 2001 NPRM of the subsequently remanded 2003 cross-ownership rules, interested 
parties would not have had to “divine [the FCC’s] unspoken thoughts,” CSX Transp., Inc. 
v. Surface Transp. Bd., 584 F.3d 1076, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Instead, Citizen Petitioners “should have anticipated the [FCC’s] final course 
in light of the initial notice,” Covad Commc’ns Co. v. FCC, 450 F.3d 528, 548 (D.C. Cir. 
2006) (internal quotation marks omitted), and consequently I cannot conclude the 2008 
NBCO rule was not at least a “logical outgrowth of the rulemaking proposal and record,” 
NVE, 436 F.3d at 191.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the Court’s decision to 
remand the NBCO rule for failure to comply with the APA’s notice and comment 
requirements.   
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For the foregoing reasons, I would uphold the FCC’s NBCO rule and allow the 
2010 Quadrennial Review to proceed.  In all other respects, I concur in the majority 
opinion. 
